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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COMPREHENSIVE
SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION'S MILITARY
OPERATIONS: EUFOR RD CONGO, EUFOR TCHAD/RCA,
AND EUNAVFOR SOMALIA**

by

Frank Hagemann

June 2010

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**STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION'S MILITARY OPERATIONS: EUFOR RD CONGO,
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, AND EUNAVFOR SOMALIA**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the European Union's approach to crisis management and compares the three most recent operations, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, and EUNAVFOR Somalia, as case studies. It finds that the European Union has reached a common understanding of comprehensive security, but it has failed to develop and implement a truly integrated approach at the political and strategic level. The thesis identifies three decisive factors for the improvement of the EU's comprehensive approach to security. First, the European Union needs a sound concept through which its plethora of civil and military tools could be seamlessly integrated and synchronized in a truly coherent approach. Second, the European Union could benefit from the establishment of a permanent Operation Headquarters providing the requested input from the very beginning of the comprehensive planning process. Third, the EU's security and defense policy could become more coherent and capable if small groups of credible nations cooperated to offer leadership, perhaps in informal directorates. The key question in this respect remains whether and how the European Union can address the friction between the need for effective leadership on the one hand and the imperative of political legitimacy on the other.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGS	Council General Secretariat
CHODS	Chief of Defense Staff
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CONOPS	Concept of Operation
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CRCT	Crisis Response Coordination Team
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CSO	Civilian Strategic Options
CTF	Coalition Task Force
DG	Directorate-General
DPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council

FHQ	EU Force Headquarters
FOC	Full Operational Capability
GAC	General Affairs Council
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GPG	Global Public Goods
HOM	Head of Mission
HR	High Representative
ICAT	International Committee to Assist the Transition
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMD	Initiating Military Directive
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IRTC	Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in Chad and the CAR
MONUC	Mission of the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPRA	Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft
MSCHOA	Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa
MSO	Military Strategic Options
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCO	EU Naval Coordination Cell
OHQ	EU Operation Headquarters
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSO	Police Strategic Options
RCA	Central African Republic
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SG	Secretary General
SG/HR	Secretary General of the Council and High Representative of the CFSP
SOR	Statement of Forces Requirements
SR	Special Representative
TEU	Treaty on the European Union

TGS	Transitional Government of Somalia
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USA	United States of America
WFP	World Food Program
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE

Since 2003, when the first EU-led military operation was launched, the European Union (EU) has developed a broader understanding of comprehensive security as a policy implementation challenge. This broader understanding underlies the judgment that the establishment of a safe and secure environment in a specific country will not only be effected by military and diplomatic means, but also by such other activities as economic reconstruction, state building, environmental protection, and human and gender rights enforcement. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the international military engagements in the Balkans and in Africa, have confirmed the judgment that a comprehensive approach to security can add value to military operations in order to meet political requirements and to achieve sustained success. In other words, civil contributions to military operations can significantly increase the effectiveness of an intervention. The comprehensive approach to security has therefore been the focus of much attention within the framework of the EU's security and defense policy as well as in other international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN). Simultaneously, the idea of comprehensive security has become a widely discussed topic within the academic community.

While the importance of comprehensive security has been increasingly recognized, its implementation remains a practical challenge. In this respect, it has been repeatedly argued that the European Union is particularly well-suited to implement a comprehensive approach to security because it possesses a unique combination of political, economic, humanitarian, military, and other instruments. In fact, since the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was launched in 1999, the European Union has emerged with a dual character as both a civilian power and a security actor in international politics.¹ It has furthermore gained a broad range of experience in more

¹ The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is the successor of the ESDP under the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009.

than twenty civil and military operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia. However, the incorporation of civil means in military operations leads to a number of obstacles and difficulties at the strategic level as well as in theatre. Against this background, an examination of EU-led military operations can illuminate the weak links in the implementation of a comprehensive approach to security and convey a broader understanding of its challenges in order to add value to future military operations.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

The broad range of literature about security studies and security concepts reflects the fundamental changes in international politics since 1989 and underscores the increasing importance of the comprehensive security issue with regard to regional security. Even though policy-makers and scholars developed the idea of comprehensive security more than sixty years ago, during the Cold War, security was seen as reliant mainly on defense and military forces. This close relationship led to a focused approach to security that did not set priorities on social, economic, humanitarian, or additional aspects. In this respect, some observers defined security as consisting mainly of “freedom from fear” of military aggression. This limited definition of security as a reliable defense and deterrence posture against a military threat was a product of the bipolar conflict between two nuclear superpowers.

Accordingly, during the Cold War, Western security policy was molded under the leadership of the United States, mostly within the framework of NATO. This alliance mainly provided collective defense. The Helsinki process, launched in 1973 with the initiation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), led to a more comprehensive view of security, reflected in the three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act. It expanded the scope of Western security policy by focusing on a number of specific issues, but it did not challenge the primacy of military defense and deterrence. Thus, the CSCE and its successor, the OSCE, failed to emerge as the leading security organization for the Euro-Atlantic region in practice.²

² David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997), 5; Sven Biscop, *The European Security Strategy* (London: Ashgate, 2005), 1–4.

The limited definition of security was questioned with the breakdown of the Eastern bloc and the end of the Soviet Union. Faced with the probability of new conflicts in the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East, the export of security and stability to these regions moved to the forefront of Western foreign and security policies. The dichotomy and the linkage between external and internal security has become more widely discussed in the last twenty years. It has furthermore created a general understanding of a comprehensive approach to security and stability as a part of overall policy. With regard to this issue, three main categories of literature can be distinguished.

The first category consists of analyses of different security concepts in general. Since 1989, liberal as well as realist scholars have largely accepted that a broader understanding of security and stability is needed than that which was dominant in Western foreign and security policy circles during the Cold War.³ Reflecting this, the 2005 UN Human Development Report cited former US Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, who stated with regard to security challenges in 1945 that the

battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells *freedom from fear*. The second is the economic and social front where victory means *freedom from want*. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace.⁴

While a broad definition of security in general is accepted today, there are still different approaches to security. Even though these approaches target the same objectives, they choose different centers of gravity and emphasize different means. The

³ Andrea Ellner, "Regional Security in a Global Context: A Critical Appraisal of European Approaches to Security," *European Security* 17, no. 1 (2008), 9.; Rolando Moschini, "The Comprehensive Security Concept of the European Union," in *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Hans Gunter Brauch (Berlin and New York: Springer, 2008), 651–657; Z. Selden, "Stabilization and Democratization: Renewing the Transatlantic Alliance," *Parameters* 37, no. 4 (2007), 85; Pernille Rieker, "From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy?" *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 4 (2006), 509–528; Bjorn Moller, "Comprehensive Security in East Asia – as Viewed in the Light of the European Experience. A Case for Cooperative Security," *Politologiske Studier* 4, no. 1 (2001), 86–87; Baldwin, *The Concept of Security*, 5; Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (1991), 3; Stephen M. Walt, "Mershon Series: The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991), 211.

⁴ Stettinius quoted in United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 12.

concept of human security advocates the comprehensive protection of human beings and aims to universalize respect for human rights. It was originally developed within the framework of the UN Development Program and has subsequently been adopted by Canada and Japan.⁵ In particular, the case of Japan proved that this concept can facilitate the establishment of safety and stability in certain areas.⁶ With regard to military operations, however, the implementation of a human security approach seems to be a huge challenge. In the short run, the intended export of norms, for example, can lead to substantial difficulties in failed or failing states. Andrea Ellner hence argues that “the approach has weaknesses in concept and practice which potentially undermine the normative aspirations”⁷ of international actors. Therefore, the concept of human security should primarily be seen as an element of long-term development policy. The civilian aspects of the EU’s approach to comprehensive security are closely linked to this concept.⁸

The concept of environmental security has achieved increasing recognition among scholars in the last fifteen years. While it is frequently maintained that environmental change—including climate change and pollution caused by human activities—can be evaluated as a security threat or, at least, as a source of security threat, Nils Petter Gleditsch argues that empirical studies are not able to provide evidence for this hypothesis.⁹ Be that as it may, environmental security studies are devoting increased attention to causes and effects of war linked to global environmental changes. Even if “a

⁵ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 226.

⁶ Astrid Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of States,” *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 3 (1999), 265–276; Roland Paris, “Human Security,” *International Security* 26, no. 2 (2001), 87; J. Matlary, “Much Ado about Little: The EU and Human Security,” *International Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2008), 131.

⁷ Ellner, *Regional Security in a Global Context: A Critical Appraisal of European Approaches to Security*, 9.

⁸ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 201–203.

⁹ Hans Günter Brauch, *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century* (Berlin; New York: Springer, 2008), 1147; Braden R. Allenby, “Environmental Security: Concept and Implementation,” *International Political Science Review* 21, no. 1 (2000), 5; Nina Graeger, “Review Essay: Environmental Security?” *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 1 (1996), 109; Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature,” *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 3 (1998), 381.

fundamental paradigmatic shift in security thinking is needed during the 21st century,”¹⁰ the ability of military forces to cope with environmental security dangers is limited. Therefore, the recent concept, as it stands, does not offer an applicable approach for peacekeeping and stabilization operations in the short run.

Nevertheless, the idea of environmental security is related to the development of a further key concept, which emerged also out of debates within the United Nations: the theory of global public goods (GPG). According to this concept, certain material and nonmaterial goods are universal in the sense that every human being is entitled to them. These goods are public because their provision is subject to the responsibility of state authorities at different levels of administration. In this regard, private suppliers and the market cannot substitute for the state. The GPG are essentially comprised of physical security and stability, the rule of law, an open and inclusive economic order, general well-being, health, education, and a clean environment. These goods are interdependent and cannot be provided without each other. Because the core GPG are equally important, crisis management efforts have to address all of them in order to reach sustainable long-term solutions for international conflicts.¹¹ Therefore, only a comprehensive approach to crisis management involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments is able to provide an effective response to the changed security environment.

The second category of works surveys the European Union as a regional security organization. Since the launch of the ESDP in 1999, the number of published works has significantly increased. While it is widely accepted that the European Union has successfully transformed its role from that of a pure civil power to a considerable military security actor in the world, there is a wide-ranging debate regarding the assessment of

¹⁰ Brauch, *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century*, 947.

¹¹ Marco A. Ferroni and Ashoka Mody, *International Public Goods: Incentives, Measurement, and Financing* (Boston, MA; Washington, DC: Kluwer Academic Publishers; World Bank, 2002), 6.

this transformation.¹² Consequently, among scholars, the transformed European Union is fundamentally differently characterized as an “ethical actor,”¹³ or—possibly—as a “tragic actor,”¹⁴ as a “normative empire,”¹⁵ a “transformative power,”¹⁶ or a “regional normative hegemon,”¹⁷ and, last but not least, as a “small power,”¹⁸ or a “global actor.”¹⁹ One reason for the varying descriptions is the elusive and unique character of the European Union. Some EU policies are determined on a supranational basis, while others involve intergovernmental decision making. Therefore, the adoption of categories like power, empire and hegemony has enriched the discussion, even though theoretically grounded empirical research remains scarce.

Several characteristics distinguish the European Union from international actors such as China, Russia, or the United States. One crucial characteristic is the complex and time-consuming decision-making process. Even though it is caused by the need for appropriate participation by twenty-six of the EU’s twenty-seven sovereign member

¹² Seth G. Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 301; Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 315; Stephanie Anderson and Thomas R. Seitz, “European Security and Defense Policy Demystified: Nation-Building and Identity in the European Union,” *Armed Forces and Society* 33, no. 1 (2006), 24; A. Bailes, “The EU and a ‘Better World’: What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy?” *International Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2008), 115; C. Gebhard, “European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46, no. 4 (2008), 900; Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic, *European Security in Transition* (London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 180; Anand Menon, “Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten,” *International Affairs* 85, no. 2 (2009), 227.

¹³ Lisbeth Aggestam, *A European Foreign Policy? Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Britain, France and Germany* (Stockholm: Stockholm University, Department of Political Science, 2004), 241.

¹⁴ Adrian Hyde-Price, “A ‘Tragic Actor’? A Realist Perspective on ‘Ethical Power Europe’,” *International Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2008), 29–44.

¹⁵ Zaki Laidi, “The Normative Empire: The Unintended Consequences of European Power,” *Garnet Policy Brief* 6 (2008), www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/policy_briefs/Garnet_Policy_Brief_No_6.pdf (accessed 28 July 2009).

¹⁶ Mark Leonard, *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century* (London: Fourth Estate, 2005), 5.

¹⁷ Hiski Haukkala, “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 9 (2008), 1601–1622.

¹⁸ Asle Toje, “The European Union as a Small Power, Or Conceptualizing Europe’s Strategic Actorness,” *Journal of European Integration* 30, no. 2 (2008), 199–215.

¹⁹ Jan Zielonka, “Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example?” *International Affairs* 84, no. 3 (2008), 471–484.

states²⁰ and a multiplicity of relevant EU bodies, it may be one of the explanations for the EU's reluctance to engage in power politics.²¹ Until late 1998, the United Kingdom opposed EU involvement in military security matters. Nevertheless, since the ESDP was launched in 1999, the European Union has successfully conducted more than twenty civil and military operations in Europe, Africa and Asia. Furthermore, it has developed a unique security culture reflecting the need for a comprehensive approach to security. In this respect, some analysts have concluded that adding value to peacekeeping or stabilization operations is more difficult than originally expected.²²

The third category of pertinent literature, that dealing with EU-led military operations, is much less extensive. Most works examine long-completed or long-standing operations—for example, Operation Althea, which the European Union took over from NATO under the “Berlin plus” arrangement in 2004.²³ In contrast, there are only a few works on recently conducted autonomous EU-led military operations. While some publications examine EUFOR RD Congo,²⁴ in particular the difficult decision-making and force generation process, a significant shortfall remains concerning the last two

²⁰ With regard to the EU's security and defense policy, there are only twenty-six member states involved because Denmark does not participate in this policy area.

²¹ Toje, *The European Union as a Small Power, Or Conceptualizing Europe's Strategic Actorness*, 199–215.

²² Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than Expected,” *European Security* 15, no. 3 (2006), 299; T. Muehlmann, “EU Civil–Military Cooperation and the Fight Against Organised Crime: Lessons to be Learned from the Bosnian Example,” *European Security* 17, no. 2/3 (2008), 387; Ursula C. Schroder, “Security Expertise in the European Union: The Challenges of Comprehensiveness and Accountability,” *European Security* 15, no. 4 (2006), 471.

²³ Among other sources, see Cornelius Friesendorf and Susan E. Penksa, “ Militarized Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 5 (2008), 677–694; Muehlmann, *EU Civil–Military Cooperation and the Fight Against Organised Crime: Lessons to be Learned from the Bosnian Example*, 387; Jakobsen, *The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than Expected*, 299.

²⁴ Jan Ryjacek, “The Decision-Making Process on the Deployment of German Armed Forces for Protecting the Elections in Congo,” *Zeitschrift Fur Parlamentsfragen* 39, no. 2 (2008), 219–232; Tarik Soylemis, “European Security and Defense Policy and its Three Critical Missions: Macedonia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Bosnia Missions,” *Uluslararası Hukuk Ve Politika* 3, no. 12 (2007), 39–51; Romain Yakemtchouk, “The European Union Faced with the Democratic Republic of the Congo – the “Eufor R. D. Congo” Operation,” *Revue Du Marche Commun Et De l'Union Europeenne*, no. 501 (2006), 512–518; Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “What is the EU in Congo? The European Africa-Strategy between Symbolism, Material Politics and Cosmopolitan Engagement,” *Internationale Politik* 61, no. 6 (2006), 84–89; Richard Gowan, “The EU's Multiple Strategic Identities: European Security After Lebanon and the Congo,” *Studia Diplomatica* 60, no. 1 (2007), 59–80; Peter Schmidt, “Volunteers, Forward!” *Internationale Politik* 61, no. 11 (2006), 68–77.

operations: EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUNAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta).²⁵ In addition, the existing literature does not analyze these operations in light of the EU approach to comprehensive security.

In a nutshell, the current status of research is disparate. While there is a consensus that a broader understanding of security is needed in order to export security and stability to neighboring regions, a number of competing security concepts are under consideration. The debate focuses in particular on the merits and shortcomings of these concepts in practice. Nevertheless, a significant gap in the literature remains regarding the EU approach to comprehensive security and its effectiveness in military operations.

C. MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis examines to what extent the European Union has achieved a comprehensive approach to security, assesses how the pursuit of this approach has affected the success of its operations to date at the strategic level, and derives lessons for future operations. In order to obtain a broad analysis taking various relevant factors into account, a number of sub-questions are addressed: First, the thesis identifies the chief characteristics of comprehensive security with regard to EU-led military operations. Second, it investigates how the EU crisis management procedures deal with civil and military contributions to ESDP operations. Third, it explores the political and strategic planning process, with particular regard to the EU's approach to comprehensive security before the launch of the operations examined in this thesis. Finally, it assesses to what extent this approach has contributed to the conduct and effectiveness of EU-led military operations. The objective in answering these questions is to prepare an analysis of the decisive factors for the improvement of a comprehensive approach to security in future operations.

²⁵ Romain Yakemtchouk, "The European EUFOR Force in Chad and in the Central African Republic," *Revue Du Marche Commun Et De l'Union Europeenne*, no. 519 (2008), 365–369; Denis M. Tull, *The Chad Crisis and Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2008), 4; E. Hermans and S. van der Meer, "EUFOR in Chad," *Militaire Spectator* 177, no. 7–8 (2008), 403–409; Stefan Brune, "Controversial Peacekeeping Operations – Europe, France and Chad," *WeltTrends*, no. 64 (2009), 19–23; Felix Arteaga, *The Chad Conflict, United Nations (MINURCAT) and the European Union (EUFOR)* (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estrategicos, 2008), 9; Daisy R. Khalifa, "No Smooth Sailing: Surge in Piracy Off Somalia Draws International Naval Response," *Seapower* 52, no. 2 (2009), 18–22.

Three hypotheses guide the research. The first is that a lack of agreement on sound concepts hampers the implementation of a comprehensive approach within the ESDP. An agreed concept seems to be a precondition for reaching a common understanding among civil and military actors in order to add value to military operations. The second is that the absence of appropriate EU crisis management procedures weakens the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to promote comprehensive security. The implementation of a broad range of civil means in EU-led military operations therefore needs to be incorporated in the planning and decision-making process at the political and strategic level. The third hypothesis is that the lack of close civil-military planning and coordination across EU bodies and agencies weakens the overall effectiveness of the EU's efforts. The conduct and effectiveness of a comprehensive approach to security in EU-led military operations seem to be significantly affected by the organization and interaction of ESDP-relevant bodies.

D. METHODOLOGY, SOURCES, AND THESIS OUTLINE

The EU's approach to comprehensive security and its effectiveness in military operations are examined in two parts. The first part (Chapter II) focuses on conceptualizing comprehensive security with regard to the European Union, and evaluates the planning and decision-making process for ESDP/CSDP, based on qualitative content analysis. In this context, different theoretical models such as realism and constructivism are employed to the extent that these models seem able to contribute to a better understanding. The sources are mainly official documents issued by security and defense-relevant EU bodies as well as works by European and American scholars.

The second part (Chapter III) employs the method of a structured and focused comparison. The three most recent EU-led military operations, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, and EUNAVFOR Somalia, are compared as case studies. Each case is examined concerning its political and strategic context, the planning and decision-making process, the conduct of operations, and the results at the political and strategic level. (The operational effects are not considered.) The outcomes of each case are then compared in order to analyze similarities, differences, and changes with regard to the

EU's approach to comprehensive security and its effectiveness. The research is based on primary sources of the European Union and its member states, secondary literature from scholarly books and journals, and—due to the subject's topicality—articles from newspapers. Finally, conclusions are presented in Chapter IV. The conclusions are based on an analysis of the decisive factors for the improvement of a comprehensive approach to security in future EU-led military operations.

II. THE EU'S APPROACH TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

A. INTRODUCTION

The idea of comprehensive security is certainly not an invention of the European Union. Scholars and policy-makers developed the concept in the context of the United Nations in response to the changing international security environment after the end of the Cold War. The idea has increasingly shaped the strategic thinking of nation states and international organizations such as the European Union, NATO, and the OSCE.²⁶ In particular, the peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations of NATO have provided evidence that “ambitious goals such as democratization and sustainable security can only be achieved through economic and political development.”²⁷

Accordingly, comprehensive security relies on a broader definition of security, one that is far more extensive than traditional, state-centric and defense-oriented political-military approaches. The idea is closely linked to different new concepts such as human security, global public goods, and cooperative security. The underlying assumption of these new concepts is that security is indivisible. No country is secure as long as other countries are insecure. Hence, the term “security” stands for the precise opposite of “defense” with its security dilemma, whereby a country’s security arises from its neighbor’s weakness and insecurity. This notion of collective security forms the basis of the strategic thinking behind the EU’s security and defense policy and its comprehensive approach to crisis management.²⁸

Comprehensive security calls for a holistic and normative approach to crisis management, and it attempts to operationalize multiple dimensions of security. As with the concept of human security, the individual is the main point of reference, not the

²⁶ Biscop, *The European Security Strategy*, 3–5.

²⁷ David S. Yost, *NATO and International Organizations* (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2007), 176.

²⁸ Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson, *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe* (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 8–13; Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 200.

state.²⁹ Key aspects of activity can thereby vary due to the security situation and the threat assessment. Nevertheless, the main idea of this concept is “the integration of lines of activity between the military, economic, political, and judicial components, as well as the police.”³⁰ As a result, the improvement of stability and security in crisis regions depends on cross-departmental and interagency cooperation at the national level as well as on close collaboration among the various national, international, and non-governmental stakeholders relevant to security issues in crisis regions.³¹

This chapter examines the EU’s approach to comprehensive security. It first discusses the nature and the purpose of the EU’s security and defense policy from different theoretical points of view. It then explores how the European Union has adopted the idea of comprehensive security and to what extent it has developed a practical concept for crisis management operations and overseas missions.

B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE CONCEPT OF COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

1. A Nascent Common Security Culture?

Since 1999, when the European Union first articulated the objective of pursuing a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), a substantial discussion has taken place with regard to the nature and purpose of the entire project. One of the main questions concerns the extent to which the development of the ESDP has contributed to the

²⁹ Biscop and Andersson, *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe*, 9.

³⁰ “Interview with Lieutenant General David Leakey, Director-General of the EU Military Staff,” *NATO Review*, 2007, no. 2, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/interview.html> (accessed 12 March 2010).

³¹ Moschini, *The Comprehensive Security Concept of the European Union*, 651–657; Philip H. Gordon, “Western Europe; the Rise of European Security Cooperation,” *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 6 (2007), 192; Lars-Erik Lundin and Kyriakos Revelas, “Security and Democracy: From the Perspective of Commission Officials Working at the Interface between ESDP and Community External Action,” *European Security* 15, no. 4 (2006), 423; Selden, *Stabilization and Democratization: Renewing the Transatlantic Alliance*, 85; H. Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (2007), 357; A. Tuscisny, “Security Communities and their Values: Taking Masses Seriously,” *International Political Science Review* 28, no. 4 (2007), 425; Charlie Edwards, *National Security for the Twenty-First Century* (London: Demos, 2007), 119; Ken Gude and Ian Kearns, *The New Front Line: Security in a Changing World* (Washington, DC; London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2008), 42.

emergence of a common security culture in the European Union.³² In this respect, opinion is deeply divided between those analysts who stress increasing elements of convergence and those who emphasize persistent and substantial differences between EU member states. This cleavage has a number of causes, but it reflects, *inter alia*, two distinct theoretical perspectives of the European Union and its external actions.³³

On the one hand, analysts from the realist school of international relations theory tend to look upon the process of international cooperation—including within the European Union—as a traditional business of inter-state bargaining that relies on the promotion of national interests. From that point of view, self-interested state actors push cooperation in policy areas in which states achieve and maintain “relative capabilities sufficient to remain secure and independent in the self-help context of international anarchy.”³⁴ Social actors other than states can contribute to the bargaining at the international level, but the most important decisions are ultimately taken by the states. That particularly applies to the foreign, security, and defense policies that realist scholars consider the strongest bastion of national sovereignty.³⁵ For proponents of this state-based framework, the intergovernmental coordination in the EU’s security and defense policy is a significant constraint and the emergence of a common security culture is “almost impossible” as long as the national interests of member states remain different.³⁶ These national differences concern crucial aspects of the ESDP/CSDP such as the use of force, the projection of power, and the legitimacy of intervention. Accordingly,

³² Nicole Gnesotto, “For a common European security culture,” *WEU-ISS, Newsletter*, no. 31 (October 2000), 1. According to Nicole Gnesotto, a common security culture can be defined as “the aim and the means to incite common thinking, compatible reactions, coherent analysis – in short, a strategic culture that is increasingly European, one that transcends the different national security cultures and interests.”

³³ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 179–181.

³⁴ Joseph M. Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory,” in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 303.

³⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 251; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), 555.

³⁶ Julian Lindley-French, “In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing,” *International Affairs* 78, no. 4 (2002), 790.

significant problems with EU-led military operations are related to the deep divisions between member states, in terms of their approaches to security.³⁷

In spite of this, EU member states have carried forward the process of coordinating their foreign, security, and defense policies. Even realist scholars admit that military coordination and integration, e.g., within the framework of NATO, have created a considerable gain in security for the participating states by closing the gap between security requirements and national resources. They argue that collective defense enables the allies to diminish duplication and overlap and that it can offer efficiencies and economies of scale as long as there is a common threat perception and substantive cooperation. Nonetheless, military coordination and integration remain a kind of zero-sum game for the participating states. Higher contributions from certain member states mean that less effort is required from other member states.³⁸ From a realist point of view, ESDP/CSDP planning and decision-making are best understood as a bargaining process that both encourages and restrains competition over the distribution of burdens and benefits among member states. In this context, the unanimity requirement of the EU's crisis management procedures helps to explain the lack of ambition of the ESDP according to the rule "the lower the level of commitment, the higher the likelihood of achieving consensus."³⁹

On the other hand, scholars from the constructivist school view international relations in more value-based or normative terms. They argue that cooperation for joint gains between self-interested actors seems possible and paves the way for a concept of collective security. Six decades of security cooperation (1950–2010) between West European countries have modified a positive interdependence into a new collective security identity, which shapes the definition of self-interests, among other things. Therefore, participating states seem able to overcome competition and achieve increased

³⁷ Menon, *Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten*, 237–238.

³⁸ Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 5–13; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 321; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), 44–79.

³⁹ Asle Toje, "The Consensus-Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe's Ineffective Foreign Policy," *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 1 (February 2008), 132.

cooperation and integration through continuing and increasingly extensive (yet relatively stable) social practices. In other words, socially constructed state identities and perceived national interests are central determinants of state behavior and of assessments of international politics.⁴⁰

Furthermore, in contrast to realist wisdom, constructivist scholars argue that national policies tend to adopt norms defined by international institutions to which they are closely linked. Some analysts detect clear signs of convergence between the national security cultures of EU member states. They argue that the process of movement towards a trans-European security culture concerns key aspects of the EU's security and defense policy such as military capacity, reliability, legitimacy, and civil-military integration. This progress has taken place despite the fact that an EU-wide identity is still absent.⁴¹

According to constructivist analysis, the changing security environment since the end of the Cold War has forced the security cooperation between the EU member states. The EU's security and defense policy has relied on the common perception that the multilateral projection of armed forces and a mix of civil and military crisis management tools are needed in order to address the changing security threats. While the EU's institutions mediate adaptation pressures from the international environment, the requirements of the common European security and defense policy offer the national governments the opportunity to communicate shared assessments to their domestic publics. In other words, because the EU's security and defense policy is by definition a cooperative endeavor and a frame of common reference, it produces collective

⁴⁰ Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 562; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 429; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), 391–425.

⁴¹ Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, "The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report," *International Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2005), 801–820; Giovanni Grevi, "Framing the European Strategic Debate," *Studia Diplomatica* 61, no. 3 (2008), 5–18; Christoph O. Meyer, "Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 4 (2005), 523–549; Rieker, *From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy?* 509–528.

expectations for behavior. These expectations can impose pressure upon national security and defense policies in order to adopt emerging EU norms.⁴²

However, adaptation pressures do not necessarily overcome ideational divergences between the national and the EU levels. In particular, when there is an implicit or explicit incompatibility with significant national norms, the adoption of EU norms appears unrealistic—at least in the short run. In contrast, convergence is unnecessary when ideational inconsistencies are absent. Constructivist scholars therefore expect the “Europeanization” of security culture in areas in which medium adaptation pressure exists.⁴³ There has been significant convergence in terms of threat perceptions among EU member states, for example. The importance of territorial defense has decreased for those EU member states that perceive no external military threat. That, in turn, has increased the acceptance of humanitarian interventions and the legitimacy of democracy promotion. In addition, despite some nuances in detail, both between EU member states and between national policy-makers and their publics, there has also been overall convergence with regard to the need for “UN authorization, multilateralism, and a rule-based order.”⁴⁴

Nevertheless, the degree of adaptation pressure differs between the EU member states. Among larger countries, the Federal Republic of Germany has faced the most pressure to modify its security culture. While the security culture of most other EU member states rests on perceptions of historical achievements, Federal German security and defense policy is based upon the rejection of the Nazi past and its militaristic excesses. The first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, developed the policy of “Westbindung,” which called for reconciliation with wartime enemies and integration into Western Europe. Therefore, the search for partners and allies

⁴² Bastian Giegerich, *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), 193–195; Christoph O. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 141–152.

⁴³ Giegerich, *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy*, 63–66.

⁴⁴ Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, 149.

and the avoidance of unilateral advantage characterized the West German government's external action. The NATO membership in 1955 offered the Federal Republic of Germany the opportunity not only to join the Western community of nations, but also to form a new collective defense and security identity. Consequently, as Jolyon Howorth has observed, NATO enabled the Federal Republic of Germany "to assert itself as a purely defensive, essentially civilian power in which the armed forces could only be used for collective defense and only in multilateral—Alliance—mode."⁴⁵

In brief, the West German "culture of restraint" relied on reconciliation with former enemies, promotion of European integration and cooperative institution building, rejection of any interest in national military power projection, and civilian—virtually pacifist—sentiments within the public. However, the fundamentally changed international security environment after the end of the Cold War caused a transformation of Germany's role in international politics. In the aftermath of reunification, the country's allies called upon Berlin to accept greater responsibility in international crisis management efforts. Especially, the re-emergence of conflict in the Balkans produced enormous pressure on German security and defense policy. Faced with the dilemma of choosing between the rejection of war and the rejection of genocide, a redefinition of the pacifist and civilian-oriented "culture of restraint" was required.⁴⁶

After lengthy domestic debates, the German Federal Constitutional Court paved the way for the employment of German armed forces outside the country. Since 1994, Germany has participated in a number of international crisis management operations. As a result, the country has transformed its role from an "importer of security" during the Cold War to an "exporter of security." Today, Germany is the third-largest force provider (after the United States and the United Kingdom) in NATO-led operations worldwide.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the country is moving slowly towards normative acceptance

⁴⁵ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 152.

⁴⁶ Giegerich, *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy*, 67–70; Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 152–154.

⁴⁷ Hubert Zimmermann, "Security Exporters: Germany, the United States, and Transatlantic Cooperation," in *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US–European Relations After Iraq*, ed. David M. Andrews (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 128–130; Christoph O. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 68.

of force projection and high-risk deployments. The cause of the slow movement resides in the fact that most Germans and nearly all German foreign policy élites tend to “regard armed conflict solely in terms of futile tragedy.”⁴⁸

France has faced less adaptation pressure because the initiation of the ESDP appeared as the fulfillment of an old French dream: “to project French security culture to a European level.”⁴⁹ Since the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, France’s foreign policy has often been affected by its quest for great power status and national grandeur. Despite that, French strategic thinking has mainly focused on the protection of national independence, the promotion of multilateral security cooperation, and the ability to project forces unilaterally. The repeated military interventions in Africa have especially demonstrated the third theme. After the end of the Cold War, France successfully shifted its security culture towards more security cooperation and multilateral force projection. Even though the Gaullist rhetoric regarding national independence remained in place, policy-makers in Paris promoted the initiation and development of the ESDP as a norms-driven, rule-based, and institutionally structured project. Accordingly, from a constructivist point of view, ideational inconsistencies between the ESDP and the French security culture seem to be minimal.⁵⁰

The United Kingdom, in contrast, faced diverging pressures. While the British Empire was the foremost West European power during the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, it lost this position due to the high costs of both world wars and the effects of decolonization after 1945. During the Cold War, the United Kingdom had huge difficulties in adapting to its international role. Even though Prime Minister Winston Churchill advocated a postwar British role dependent on three “circles”⁵¹ to maintain

⁴⁸ Donald Abenheim, *Soldier and Politics Transformed: German–American Reflections on Civil Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment* (Berlin Hartmann: Males-Verl, 2007), 124.

⁴⁹ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 188–189.

⁵⁰ Giegerich, *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU’s Security and Defence Policy*, 76–81; Rieker, *From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy?* 517–521.

⁵¹ William Wallace, “The Collapse of British Foreign Policy,” *International Affairs* 81, no. 1 (Jan 2005), 53–55. The three circles stand for (1) the special relationship with the United States, (2) the British Commonwealth and Empire, followed by the British Commonwealth of Nations, and (3) the links with the United Kingdom’s continental European neighbors.

global influence, there was little doubt among British policy-makers that London gained most from transatlantic special relations and least from cooperation with continental European neighbors. Two factors set the basis for this perception. First, the United States offered privileged access to nuclear and other military capabilities and promised ongoing close cooperation in defense and security affairs. London hence benefited more from these special relations than Washington did. Second, the United Kingdom remained skeptical regarding the process of European integration, even though the country joined the European Community for economic reasons in 1973. Both British policy-makers and the public were concerned that centralized and integrated European structures could undermine the country's political freedom of action and national sovereignty.⁵²

Consequently, the United Kingdom faced the highest adaptation pressure in the area of security cooperation between EU member states and the lowest with regard to force projection. As the British Empire has traditionally employed armed forces as a means of power projection alongside civilian instruments, London has had no difficulties with the mix of civil and military instruments at the heart of the emerging EU security culture. The United Kingdom seems to be able to “Europeanize” its national security culture as long as these adjustments are compatible with NATO and its special relationship with the United States. Nevertheless, the British public remains a “reluctant follower” in the process of European integration.⁵³

The key result of constructivist analysis is that the security cultures of EU member states have become more similar, even though the movement towards a common European security culture has proceeded slowly. As Christoph Meyer has stated, the evidence for convergence is particularly germane concerning “the use of force for humanitarian purposes, the acceptance of the EU as an appropriate framework for security and defense policy, and the de-prioritization of the partnership with the United

⁵² Luigi Barzini, *The Europeans* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 60–61; William Wallace and Tim Olliver, “A Bridge Too Far: The United Kingdom and the Transatlantic Relationship,” in *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US–European Relations After Iraq*, ed. David M. Andrews (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 155–156.

⁵³ Giegerich, *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy*, 84–86.

States.”⁵⁴ Nevertheless, realist analysis challenges these constructivist findings concerning the emerging EU security culture. It is clear that the train is moving for the European Union, but it is less clear where the tracks will lead. Consequently, definite conclusions with regard to the long-term prospects of the EU’s security and defense policy cannot be drawn at this stage.

Be that as it may, by synthesizing tentative results from both realist and constructivist analyses, it can be concluded that France and the United Kingdom have become the main drivers behind the EU’s security and defense policy. These are the two EU member states that spend the most on military capabilities and operations, and both countries have successfully transmitted their preferences to the EU level. In contrast, Germany, which has modified its security culture more than France and the United Kingdom have adjusted theirs, has been mainly an agenda-taker to date. Yet, regarding a number of practical security and defense issues, Germany has occupied a position in the middle between France, which has aimed to multiply its power by EU means, and the United Kingdom, which has avoided challenging NATO’s role at the heart of European security cooperation.⁵⁵

2. The EU’s Comprehensive Security Strategy

The European Security Strategy (ESS) defines the key features of the EU’s approach to comprehensive security. The document, developed in 2003, was aimed at moving beyond the disputes that shaped the European agenda in the forefront of the Iraq War. Accordingly, the ESS represents a compromise between different security cultures and national interests.⁵⁶ The first section deals with the changed security environment. While large-scale aggression against EU member states has become improbable since the end of the Cold War, the European Union faces “new threats which are more diverse, less

⁵⁴ Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, 11.

⁵⁵ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 57–60; Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth and Bastian Giegerich, “Europe: A Time for Strategy,” Egmont Paper 27 (Royal Institute for International Affairs), http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paper_egm.html (accessed 1 March 2010,).

⁵⁶ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 199–203.

visible and less predictable.”⁵⁷ The ESS identifies, in particular, five key threats, which could, taken together, confront the European Union with serious challenges. These key threats are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.⁵⁸

The second section addresses the identified threats and outlines strategic objectives. The ESS emphasizes that “in an era of globalization ... the first line of defense will often be abroad.”⁵⁹ Distant threats such as nuclear activities in North Korea, state failure in West Africa, and WMD proliferation in the Middle East may be as pertinent as those that are near at hand. As terrorists and criminals operate worldwide, they can cause harm to EU member states and their citizens. These new and dynamic threats cannot be tackled by purely military means. Each threat requires a mix of complementary instruments. Furthermore, the ESS specifies two strategic objectives: (1) building security in the European Union’s neighborhood, and (2) creating an effective multilateral system that is committed to international law and the United Nations Charter.

The third section deals with policy implications. According to the ESS, the European Union “needs to be more active, more coherent, and more capable” in pursuing its strategic objectives. This conclusion applies “to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention ..., including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade, and development activities.” The European Union needs “to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.” In doing so, the European Union “would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer, and more united world.”⁶⁰

Sven Biscop argues that the five key features of the ESS are integration, prevention, global scope, multilateralism, and a new definition of power. (1) The EU’s comprehensive security strategy rests on the perception that the variety of security

⁵⁷ “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Approved by the European Council on 12 December 2003,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=en> (accessed 1 March 2010).

⁵⁸ “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.”

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

dimensions requires a coordinated mobilization of the full spectrum of policy instruments. The integration of these different civil and military tools lies at the heart of the EU's approach to crisis management. (2) Active prevention of conflict and instability aims at safeguarding and improving access to global public goods worldwide "by multilateral means, in the interest not only of the EU, but of all regions and States, and in fact of all human beings."⁶¹ (3) In a globalized world, local tensions and armed conflicts can destabilize the international order. The notion of collective security therefore demands a global scope of action. (4) A comprehensive security strategy operates through dialogue, bargaining, partnership, and institutionalized, rule-based cooperation. Jolyon Howorth regards that as the notion of "effective multilateralism," which aims at fostering global governance. In this respect, coercion is not excluded, but is seen as a means of last resort.⁶² (5) The European Union accepts that it must have the will and the capacity to change the course of global affairs. Comprehensiveness in this context means that the development of hard power is required alongside the existing EU "civilian" power. Nevertheless, the European Union remains different from nation states. The EU is a unique actor on the international stage that does not challenge powers such as the United States.⁶³

Together, these elements establish a sound basis for a holistic and normative approach to crisis management. The rhetoric of the ESS furthermore suggests the conclusion that a common security culture in the European Union is emerging.⁶⁴ Sven Biscop therefore argues that the European Security Strategy "certainly has the potential to serve as an integrating conceptual framework for EU external action, to be an effective comprehensive strategy for external action."⁶⁵ The ESS offers, in fact, a rationale for the European Union to address multiple security threats in a complex environment.

⁶¹ Biscop, *The European Security Strategy*, 26.

⁶² Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 204.

⁶³ Biscop, *The European Security Strategy*, 23–33.

⁶⁴ Giegerich, *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy*, 193–195; Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 205–206; Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, 141–152.

⁶⁵ Biscop, *The European Security Strategy*, 34.

Simultaneously, the variety of security objectives—including sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human and gender rights, the rule of law, equality, social solidarity, and sustainable development—presents crucial analytical and practical difficulties. One major point in this regard is that the many kinds of security objectives hamper a clear understanding of what is really meant by security and what the requirements are for action. Hence, David Baldwin points out that, “if security is specified in terms of threats to all acquired values of a state, it becomes almost synonymous with national welfare or national interest and is virtually useless for distinguishing among policy objectives.”⁶⁶

Furthermore, the implementation of the comprehensive approach to security may also encounter cultural obstacles. As with the human security concept, the European Union claims to a greater or lesser extent universality for its aspirations, neglecting the fact that there are competing “visions of the good life”⁶⁷ in the international system. The EU’s pursuit and enforcement of what it regards as “universal” normative objectives could provoke resistance in traditional societies. Thus, the intrinsically intended improvement of stability and security in crisis regions may be hampered.⁶⁸ In other words, the simultaneous pursuit of many kinds of security could overload the EU’s security and defense policy in practice.

As a result, the EU’s holistic and normative approach to security may have the potential to add value to international crisis management efforts, but it leaves a crucial question unanswered: Which actionable general conclusions can be drawn from the ESS with regard to the course and direction of the EU’s security and defense policy? Actually, the ESS on its own offers little in terms of concrete recommendations because it does not provide a mechanism that would define when, where, why, and how the European Union should act on the international stage. Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri therefore

⁶⁶ Baldwin, *The Concept of Security*, 17–18.

⁶⁷ Hyde-Price, A ‘Tragic Actor’? A Realist Perspective on ‘Ethical Power Europe,’ 33.

⁶⁸ Ellner, *Regional Security in a Global Context: A Critical Appraisal of European Approaches to Security*, 9; Hyde-Price, A ‘Tragic Actor’? A Realist Perspective on ‘Ethical Power Europe’, 29–44; Adrian Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 2 (2006), 217–234.

argue that the ESS is just a “pre-strategic concept.”⁶⁹ This assessment continues to be accurate, in light of the official report on the implementation of the ESS adopted by the European Council in December 2008. The report states that, “despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. For our full potential to be realized we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active.”⁷⁰ The report reaffirmed the threat assessment and strategic objectives of the ESS, but it did not develop a sound mechanism in order to operationalize the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management. Consequently, the European Union still needs a grand strategic concept that merges the full spectrum of policy instruments into the single methodological framework that comprehensive security demands.

C. COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING WITHIN THE EU’S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

1. The Changing Institutional Structure

Even though the ESDP was created as a part of the overarching Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it was clear from the very beginning that the introduction of this new field of EU policies required new institutional structures and decision-making procedures. This framework, which was established between 1999 and 2003, represents a distinctive approach to crisis management that needs to be clarified. The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, introduced the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as a replacement for the ESDP and changed the pillar structure and the institutional architecture of the CFSP. The most important changes are noted below. It should nonetheless be observed that the three operations examined in Chapter III were neither planned nor conducted under the auspices of the Lisbon Treaty.

In the decade prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (1999–2009) the EU created a complex decision-making framework with regard to the EU’s security and

⁶⁹ Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri, “A European Defence Strategy,” Bertelsmann Foundation, http://cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2004/2004_Venusberg_Report.pdf (accessed 1 March 2010).

⁷⁰ “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Approved by the European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=en> (accessed 1 March 2010).

defense policy because three distinct institutional structures needed to be involved: first, the Council of the EU with its committee structure; second, the related Council General Secretariat with its administrative structure; and third, the European Commission with its supranational structure.⁷¹ Nevertheless, formal decision making on security and defense-related issues is embedded in the intergovernmental structure of the EU, while the European Community (EC) and its supranational institutions are less involved in the process.

The *European Council* is the highest decision-making institution in CFSP affairs, including ESDP and (since December 2009) CSDP. The Council is composed of the Heads of State and Government of the member states as well as the President of the European Commission, and (since December 2009) the President of the European Council. It defines unanimously the principles and general guidelines (e.g., common strategies) to be implemented in areas where the member states have interests in common.⁷² The Council is chaired by the President of the European Council, who is one of the top representatives of the European Union on the international stage and reports to the European Parliament. Until the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the presidency rotated among the twenty-seven member states every six months. Since then, the European Council has appointed its president for a two-and-a-half year term, with the possibility of a single reappointment. On 19 November 2009, the European Council agreed to appoint Herman van Rompuy, then the Belgian Prime Minister, as its first permanent president under the Lisbon Treaty.⁷³

While the Heads of State and Government usually meet four times a year, the *Council of the EU* convenes in different configurations at the ministerial level almost every week. Since the launch of the ESDP in 1999, most decisions, e.g., the Joint

⁷¹ Annika Bjorkdahl and Maria Stromvik, *EU Crisis Management Operations: ESDP Bodies and Decision-Making Procedures* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008), 13; Yost, *NATO and International Organizations*, 82–84.

⁷² Article 26 §§ 1–2 Treaty of the European Union (TEU), “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 9 May 2008,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1296&lang=en> (accessed 14 April 2010).

⁷³ Article 15 §§ 5–6 TEU.

Action⁷⁴ or the formal launch of an operation, have been taken by the *General Affairs and External Relations Council* (GAERC). However, the Council of the EU is an authoritative body of the European Union regardless of its configuration.⁷⁵ For example, the Joint Action on Operation Artemis in Congo was adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council, and later on, the operation was formally launched by the ministers of agriculture.⁷⁶ The Council of the EU has no formal defense configuration, but the ministers of defense meet informally or together with the ministers of foreign affairs four times a year. In contrast to other policy areas in which qualified majority voting is sufficient, decisions with military or defense implications require unanimity. A decision is blocked when one member state exercises a veto.⁷⁷

Until December 2009, the GAERC brought together the ministers of foreign affairs once a month. The Lisbon Treaty (Article 16 § 6 TEU) divided this council configuration into the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and the General Affairs Council (GAC). While the FAC is chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the GAC and the other council configurations are chaired by the member state holding the rotating presidency. The presidency continues to rotate among the twenty-seven member states every six months.⁷⁸

The *Political and Security Committee* (PSC) is the key body that initiates and develops all aspects of CFSP-related issues. The PSC meets at the ambassadorial level twice a week as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. A European Commission representative participates as well, in order to ensure consistency in the EU's external relations. The PSC was the "workhorse in ESDP decision-shaping"⁷⁹ and remains under the Lisbon Treaty responsible for preparing a coherent EU response to a crisis, and it

⁷⁴ The term is explained in a later part of this chapter.

⁷⁵ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 63–67.

⁷⁶ Bjorkdahl and Stromvik, *EU Crisis Management Operations: ESDP Bodies and Decision-Making Procedures*, 15; S. Duke, "Consensus Building in ESDP: The Lessons of Operation Artemis," *International Politics* 46, no. 4 (2009), 398.

⁷⁷ "Guide De La PESD – RPUE – Représentation Permanente De La France Auprès De l'Union Européenne," <http://www.rpfrance.eu/spip.php?article776> (accessed 11 September 2009).

⁷⁸ Article 16 § 6 TEU.

⁷⁹ Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*, 116.

exercises political control and strategic direction of EU crisis management operations. In addition, it monitors the international security situation and provides guidance to the EU Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. The PSC is still chaired by the member state holding the rotating presidency. Starting in January 2011, a deputy of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will chair the PSC.⁸⁰

The *EU Military Committee* (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council of the EU. It formally comprises the EU member states' Chiefs of Defense Staff (CHODS) who participate in official meetings twice a year. The EUMC usually meets at the level of the military representatives of the CHODS once a week. It provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military affairs within the EU. It also gives direction to the EU Military Staff and evaluates strategic planning documents on possible military operations. The Chairman of the EUMC, a former national Chief of Defense Staff, plays a major role within the EU's security and defense framework. He is the chief military adviser to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and attends PSC and Council meetings as necessary. In addition, he is the primary point of contact for the Operation Commander during EU-led military operations.⁸¹

The *Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management* (CIVCOM) works in parallel with the EUMC and provides advice and recommendations on civilian aspects of crisis management (e.g., police, the rule of law, and administration) and conflict prevention. Furthermore, the CIVCOM is responsible for taking measures to ensure consistency in the EU's civilian crisis management. Because supranational actions (e.g., the European Commission's Instrument for Stability) have the potential to overlap with civilian ESDP/CSDP missions, this task is of crucial importance in order to avoid friction and duplication.⁸²

⁸⁰ "EU Council Decision of 22 January 2001 Setting Up the Political and Security Committee," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=en> (accessed 11 September 2009).

⁸¹ "EU Council Decision of 22 January 2001 Setting Up the Military Committee of the European Union," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=en> (accessed 11 September 2009).

⁸² *Guide De La PESD – RPUE – Représentation Permanente De La France Auprès De l'Union Européenne*, 24–25.

The *Secretary General of the Council of the EU* (SG) was “double-hatted” as the *High Representative (HR) of the CFSP* until December 2009. After Javier Solana was appointed the SG/HR in 1999, he became the “face and voice” of the EU’s foreign, security and defense policy. He assisted the Council of the EU in all matters related to the formulation, preparation, and implementation of CFSP, including ESDP, and acted on behalf of the Council of the EU in conducting political dialogue with third parties. He participated in both European Council and GAERC meetings.⁸³ Due to his central role within the framework of CFSP and ESDP, the SG/HR possessed wide informal power, in particular in the agenda-setting phase.⁸⁴

The Lisbon Treaty replaced the SG/HR by a new double-hatted post. The *High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy* combines the functions of the HR of the CFSP and of the Vice-President of the European Commission in charge of External Relations. The new HR post includes coordination across the full range of EU external policies, external representation of the European Union, the preparation and implementation of CFSP decisions and the responsibility for the planning and conduct of EU-led crisis management operations. On 19 November 2009, the European Council agreed to appoint Lady Catherine Ashton the HR of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.⁸⁵

The *Council General Secretariat* (CGS) with its nearly 3,000 officials from across the EU supports the Council of the EU. The duties and responsibilities of the CGS are comprehensive. It performs traditional secretariat tasks, provides policy advice, and formulates compromise proposals on request. Within the CGS, the *Directorate-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs* (DG E) dealt with all aspects related to CFSP. Security and defense issues were distributed to the Defense Directorate (DG E VIII), the

⁸³ “CONSILIUM – Javier Solana”
<http://consilium.europa.eu/App/Solana/default.aspx?lang=EN&cmsid=246> (accessed 11 September 2009).

⁸⁴ Bjorkdahl and Stromvik, *EU Crisis Management Operations: ESDP Bodies and Decision-Making Procedures*, 16–17.

⁸⁵ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, eds., *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999–2009)* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 60–62.

Directorate for Civilian Crisis-Management (DG E IX), and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which exercised the tasks of the operation headquarters for civilian ESDP missions.⁸⁶

In November 2008, the French presidency proposed the creation of a *Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)*, in order to conduct integrated strategic planning. Although the details of the organization are still unclear, the CMPD has the aim of bringing together all the strategic planning capabilities (DG E VIII, DG E IX, and parts of the Civ-Mil Cell noted below) across the CGS.⁸⁷ However, these institutional arrangements are subject to further change within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty. A significant innovation will be the establishment of the *European External Action Service (EEAS)* in order to assist the HR of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in fulfilling her mandate. The EEAS will include officials from the relevant departments of the CGS, the European Commission, and governments of the EU member states. The size, composition, and institutional position of the new service remain subject to negotiation. However, the EEAS will include the CMPD and the EUMS.⁸⁸

The *EU Military Staff (EUMS)* is composed of about 200 military experts seconded by member states to the CGS. It is the primary source of military expertise and supports the EUMC and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in strategic planning and conduct of crisis management operations, early warning, and situation assessment. During the ESDP period (that is, until December 2009) the *Civil-Military Cell (Civ-Mil Cell)* within the EUMS was tasked with enhancing civil-military coordination in the context of CFSP and ESDP. It also assisted the CPCC in planning and conducting civil ESDP operations. Furthermore, the EUMS and Civ-Mil Cell were involved in the planning of security sector reform missions that had civilian as well as military aspects. The Civ-Mil Cell could also set up the *EU Operations Center*

⁸⁶ *Guide De La PESD – RPUE – Représentation Permanente De La France Auprès De l’Union Européenne*, 26–27.

⁸⁷ Luis Simon, *Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations (Occasional Paper no. 81, January 2010)* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 25–26.

⁸⁸ Grevi, Helly and Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999–2009)*, 60–62.

(EU OpsCen) to plan and conduct limited autonomous operations (fewer than 2,000 troops) when no national headquarters could be identified.⁸⁹

The *EU Operation Commander* is responsible for planning and conducting a defined military operation at the military strategic level. He is appointed by the Council of the EU and authorized to exercise operational command or operational control over assigned forces. The Operation Commander is charged with development of operational documents, generating the military forces, and coordinating the deployment, sustainment, and re-deployment of the European Union forces. He is supported by the *EU Operation Headquarters* (OHQ), located outside the area of operations. Because the European Union does not possess a standing command structure for autonomous military operations, the member states provide the OHQ, as well as the *EU Force Headquarters* (FHQ) in theatre, on a case-by-case basis.⁹⁰ The FHQ supports the EU Force Commander, who executes a military operation at the operational level under the authority of the Operation Commander.⁹¹

Even though the ESDP was created as a purely intergovernmental endeavor involving twenty-six participating member states,⁹² the *European Commission* has been fully associated with the CFSP and ESDP from the very beginning. The European Commission has the right of policy initiative along with the member states and brings to the discussions its knowledge of policy areas under its responsibility (e.g., trade and sanctions regulations, humanitarian aid, development assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction). Furthermore, the European Commission manages the CFSP budget line and draws up the preliminary draft budget to be submitted to the Council of the EU and the European Parliament every year. Even though the European Community budget cannot be used to directly fund EU-led military operations, the Rapid Reaction

⁸⁹ “EU Council Decision of 10 May 2005 on the Establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=en> (accessed 11 September 2009).

⁹⁰ OHQ are provided by France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The Council can activate one of these OHQ, which needs to be augmented by the member states in order to achieve operational capability.

⁹¹ Tom Hadden, *The Responsibility to Assist: EU Policy and Practice in Crisis Management Operations Under European Security and Defence Policy* (London: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2009), 80–84.

⁹² One EU member state, Denmark, does not participate in the EU’s security and defense policy.

Mechanism and the Instrument for Stability with its two components, long-term action and crisis response, provide useful support in conjunction with these operations.⁹³ While the European Commission's role in the purely military dimension of the EU's security and defense policy remains limited, it has become increasingly more difficult to draw a clear dividing line between European Commission and CFSP responsibilities in the field of civilian crisis management, rule of law issues, institution building, and security sector reforms.⁹⁴ As a result, close coordination has become of utmost importance with regard to the EU's comprehensive approach to security.

2. Procedures for EU Crisis Management

The EU possesses a wide range of civil and military instruments for use in response to a crisis. They are subject to different institutional frameworks and thus to distinct decision-making processes.⁹⁵ The EU's crisis management procedures take into account the fact that close coordination of the different bodies and actors is needed in order to ensure a high degree of coherence. The Council General Secretariat (CGS) and the European Commission work together to this end. The crisis management procedures cover every phase of a crisis and separate the planning process into different steps through which civil-military coordination is continuously ensured:

1.) When a crisis emerges, it may be considered that EU action is appropriate. An initial joint assessment with information from various resources sets the stage for the discussion in the PSC, in particular with regard to the potential availability of forces and the political feasibility and strategic desirability of a possible operation. The outcomes of this discussion initiate the development of the *Crisis Management Concept* (CMC). This

⁹³ Giovanni Grevi, *Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU Special Representatives* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2007), 151; Hadden, *The Responsibility to Assist: EU Policy and Practice in Crisis Management Operations Under European Security and Defence Policy*, 38–41. The Instrument for Stability is endowed with over 2 billion euros over the period 2007 to 2013.

⁹⁴ Catriona Gourlay, "European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 3 (2004), 405–407; Bjorkdahl and Stromvik, *EU Crisis Management Operations: ESDP Bodies and Decision-Making Procedures*, 19–20; Gisela Muller-Brandeck-Bocquet, "The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System of the European Union," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 7, no. 3 (2002), 274–278.

⁹⁵ This section builds on various sources, including the author's experience in working on ESDP matters within the German Military Delegation to the EUMC.

document's grand strategic plan ensures full coherence among the different EU actors. It describes the desired end-state and key objectives, and proposes major strategic options and possible exit-strategies in response to the crisis. The first draft CMC is prepared by an ad hoc Crisis Response Co-ordination Team (CRCT) consisting of officials from the CGS (including the EUMS) and the Commission. The EUMC und CIVCOM provide advice and recommendations on the military and civil aspects of the document before the revised draft is negotiated in the PSC. Once the PSC has agreed to the final draft, the Council of the EU approves the CMC and tasks the elaboration of Strategic Options.⁹⁶

2.) If a military operation in response to a crisis is considered, the PSC assigns the elaboration of *Military Strategic Options* (MSO). The first draft is lead-managed by the EUMS and covers prioritized options, an assessment of feasibility and risks, recommendations regarding command and control structure, headquarters and commanders, and an indication of possibly available forces. At this stage, the CRCT aims to ensure overall planning coherence between MSO, Police Strategic Options (PSO), and other Civilian Strategic Options (CSO). The EUMC (CIVCOM) evaluates the MSO (PSO and CSO) and forwards them to the PSC together with its advice and recommendations. Based on this advice, the PSC evaluates the overall coherence of the proposed options (that is, MSO, PSO, and/or CSO) before the Council of the EU adopts the formal decision to take action, mostly in the form of a *Joint Action*. This document creates the legal basis of the operation and formally designates the Operation Commander, the Force Commander, the OHQ and FHQ, or the civilian Head of Mission (HoM). Furthermore, the Joint Action usually contains, among other provisions, decisions on the funding, the launch, and the duration of the operation.⁹⁷

3.) When the Joint Action is adopted by the Council of the EU, the PSC tasks the EUMC to draft the *Initiating Military Directive* (IMD), which provides guidance to the Operation Commander for the development of the necessary military strategic planning

⁹⁶ Bjorkdahl and Stromvik, *EU Crisis Management Operations: ESDP Bodies and Decision-Making Procedures*, 24–31; *Guide De La PESD – RPUE – Représentation Permanente De La France Auprès De l'Union Européenne*, 32–33.

⁹⁷ Bjorkdahl and Stromvik, *EU Crisis Management Operations*, 30–32; *Guide De La PESD – RPUE – Représentation Permanente De La France Auprès De l'Union Européenne*, 33.

documents. The overall planning coherence between civil and military aspects of the operation has to be ensured by joint meetings attended by civil and military planners. Once the PSC has approved the IMD, the Operation Commander drafts the *Concept of Operation* (CONOPS) defining the military strategic objectives, guidelines on the use of force, and a Statement of Forces Requirements (SOR). The EUMC provides advice and recommendations on these documents before the PSC endorses the revised drafts and submits them to the Council of the EU for formal approval. Simultaneously, the EUMC tasks the Operation Commander to conduct the force generation process.⁹⁸

4.) Before the launch of the operation, the Operation Commander drafts the *Operation Plan* (OPLAN) outlining the conduct of operations and defining the Rules of Engagement (ROE). The EUMC evaluates the document and provides advice and recommendations to the PSC, which submits the revised drafts to the Council of the EU for formal approval. Afterwards, the Council of the EU approves the OPLAN and the ROE, decides to launch the operation once the force generation is completed, and authorizes the PSC to exercise political control and strategic direction of the operation. The Operation Commander is then responsible for the conduct of the military operation and reports to the PSC and the EUMC on its progress. Finally, once the operation is completed, a “lessons learned” process takes place.⁹⁹

D. SUMMARY

The chapter has argued that comprehensive security relies on a broader definition of security, far beyond traditional, state-centric and defense-oriented, politico-military approaches. The term is closely linked to various new concepts such as human security, global public goods, and cooperative security. Comprehensive security calls for a holistic and normative approach to crisis management and attempts to operationalize multiple dimensions of security. Thereby, the individual is the main point of reference, not the state.

⁹⁸ Gourlay, *European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management*, 409–410; Bjorkdahl and Stromvik, *EU Crisis Management Operations: ESDP Bodies and Decision-Making Procedures*, 32–33.

⁹⁹ Hadden, *The Responsibility to Assist: EU Policy and Practice in Crisis Management Operations Under European Security and Defence Policy*, 69–74; Bjorkdahl and Stromvik, *EU Crisis Management Operations: ESDP Bodies and Decision-Making Procedures*, 33–35.

The ESS offers a chance to address multiple security threats in a complex environment. Its key features are integration, prevention, global scope, multilateralism, and a new definition of power. These elements taken together can provide a sound basis for the EU's approach to comprehensive security. However, the implementation of a truly integrated approach depends on cross-departmental and interagency cooperation at the national level as well as on close collaboration among the various national, international, and non-governmental stakeholders relevant to security issues in crisis regions. In this regard, the ESS does not provide the needed mechanism through which the plethora of civil and military tools can be integrated and synchronized into a comprehensive approach to crisis management.

In short, the vague nature of the ESS derives from the divergent national security cultures of the EU member states. A grand strategic concept is nevertheless a precondition for reaching a common understanding among civil and military actors in order to operationalize the idea of comprehensive security and to harmonize the external action of the EU bodies and member state agencies relevant to the EU's security and defense policy. As long as there is a lack of agreement on a sound mechanism which could effectively integrate and synchronize the array of policy instruments, the EU's ability to implement a truly integrated comprehensive approach within its security and defense policy will be constrained.

Furthermore, the complex and cumbersome decision-making process for military operations reflects not only the need for appropriate consultations with member states, but also the EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management. Political-military activities are incorporated into an overall concept of EU crisis management that considers short-term military engagement along with long-term civil efforts. Nevertheless, military crisis management is strictly conducted according to intergovernmental procedures, while civilian development and peace-building efforts in the long run are embedded into the supranational community. Consequently, the success of the EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management depends on the effective coordination of all relevant EU actors.

In principle, the EU crisis management procedures provide a sound basis for comprehensive and coherent strategic planning at all stages of the decision-making process for military operations. However, the respective roles of the European Commission and Council of the EU, the balance between civil and military aspects, and individual views or interests of member states and involved EU bodies pose a number of problems in practice. Against this background, the planning and conduct of three EU-led military operations at the political and strategic level are examined in Chapter III.

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III. COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY WITHIN EU-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS

A. CASE STUDY: EUFOR RD CONGO

1. Introduction

The wider Great Lakes region in Africa has been affected by continuous political instability, civil wars, and inter-state conflicts since the early 1990s. In November 1996, the tensions from the war and genocide in Rwanda spilled over to its western neighbor country and provoked the First Congo War. President Joseph-Désiré Mobutu's rule ended six months later when a rebel force supported by Uganda and Rwanda seized the capital city, Kinshasa. Rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila took over the office of president and changed the country's name back to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), instead of the name Zaire, which had been introduced by Mobutu. The first military conflict was quickly followed by the Second Congo War when the new government of the DRC asked its former allies to remove their armed forces from the country. Rwanda and Uganda, unwilling to lose control over their neighbor country, built up new rebel movements which launched attacks against the fragile armed forces of the DRC in August 1998. Afterwards, most other neighbor countries, including Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, became involved in that war, which finally evolved into a political and military stalemate in 2000.¹⁰⁰

The assassination of President Kabila, who was succeeded by his son Joseph, led to a turning point in January 2001. Concerted international efforts gave rise to a ceasefire agreement and forced the foreign powers to leave the country. Finally, the Pretoria and Sun City agreements paved the way to a transition process and the formation of a new government including representatives of rebel movements. While the transition process was supported by the International Committee to Assist the Transition (ICAT), the implementation of the peace agreements was monitored by the UN mission in the DCR

¹⁰⁰ Hans Hoebeke, Stéphanie Carette and Koen Vlassenroot, *EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Paris: Centre d'analyse strategique. Prime Ministre. Republique Francaise, 2007), 4.

(MONUC).¹⁰¹ The presence of MONUC was successively increased from 5,000 troops in 2003 to more than 17,000 in 2006, mainly deployed in the unstable eastern provinces of the DRC.¹⁰²

The political objective of the peace agreements was to achieve a sustainable conflict solution as a basis for peace, stability and development. Therefore, the transition process in the DRC, accompanied by the ICAT, had to deal with problems such as the unification of the national territory, the formation of national armed forces, the establishment of basic security, and, last but not least, the building of strong national institutions. One crucial element of this process was the scheduling of democratic elections in the DRC in the summer of 2006. The preparation and conduct of the elections seemed to necessitate the reinforcement of the UN peacekeeping operation, with targeted support at a critical point of the transition. Against this background, in December 2005, the United Nations' Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, invited the European Union to deploy a military force in order to assist MONUC during the upcoming election process.¹⁰³

2. Planning and Decision Making

The European Union had been involved in the peace process in the DRC from the very beginning in 1996. In this respect, the appointment of Ambassador Aldo Ajello as the EU Special Representative (SR) for the Great Lakes region provided a point of contact for the coordination of the EU's overall engagement and ensured continuous political support for the projected transition. In close coordination with the Commission's delegation in Kinshasa, the EU SR contributed to the international efforts and maintained regular contacts with key stakeholders in that country. Furthermore, the EU had launched

¹⁰¹ Claudia Major, *EU–UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 15.

¹⁰² Stefan Plenk, *The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Debate in Germany Concerning EUFOR RD Congo Mission* (München: Grin, 2007), 6–7.

¹⁰³ Helmut Fritsch, *EUFOR RD Congo: A Misunderstood Operation?* (Kingston, Ont: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 2008), 9; Major, *EU–UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006*, 15–17; Plenk, *The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Debate in Germany Concerning EUFOR RD Congo Mission*, 6–7.

three ESDP missions in the DRC since 2003. The most visible one was Operation Artemis, the first autonomous EU-led military operation, conducted for four months until September 2003. This operation contributed in particular to the improvement of the security situation in Bunia, the provincial capital city of Ituri, and enabled MONUC to reinforce its contingents before taking over responsibility in that region.¹⁰⁴

In addition to the military operation known as Artemis, two civilian ESDP missions had been deployed to the DRC. First, Operation EUPOL Kinshasa provided support and advice for the training of police forces in the Congolese capital city from April 2005 to June 2007. The mission, which received 4.37 million euros of the CFSP budget, numbered approximately thirty police officers and was deployed at the request of the DRC's government in close cooperation with the United Nations. Due to the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL for the electoral period, the budget line was extended with 3.5 million euros in April 2006.¹⁰⁵ The mission's main task consisted of supporting and assisting the national police forces in Kinshasa during the transition process.¹⁰⁶

Second, Operation EUSEC RD Congo, also launched in 2005, provided advice and assistance for security sector reform in support of the armed forces. The mission was composed of sixty experts based in Kinshasa and in provincial cities in the eastern part of the DRC. The experts were assigned to crucial positions within the armed forces in order to provide advice regarding command and control, budgetary and financial management, and training. Additionally, EUSEC conducted a project to set up a chain of payments system for the armed forces of the DRC. The mission received 1.6 million euros of the

¹⁰⁴ Further information available at "CONSILIUM – ARTEMIS/DRC" <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=605&lang=en> (accessed 21 November 2009); Hoebeke, Stéphanie Carette and Koen Vlassenroot, *EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo*, 7–8.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 9–10.

¹⁰⁶ Further information available at "CONSILIUM – EUPOL Kinshasa" <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=788&lang=en> (accessed 21 November 2009). Since 2007, the mission has been followed by EUPOL RD Congo.

CFSP budget from May 2005 to May 2006, as well as 1.84 million euros for the chain of payments project, and an extension of 4.75 million euros until June 2007.¹⁰⁷

Against this background, the European Union launched the planning and decision-making process for a possible military operation in the DRC on the basis of the UN request from December 2005. The United Nations clearly asked for timely limited and targeted support to the transition process at the crucial point of preparation and conduct of national elections.¹⁰⁸ From the very beginning, EU member states and the European Commission appeared willing to satisfy the UN request. In particular, Belgium, the former colonial power, and France, which had been actively engaged in the region for a long period of time, strongly advocated a military intervention under the EU flag. However, a major problem arose. Because Great Britain, despite its general support, did not want to get involved in a military operation in the DRC, Germany came under pressure to provide essential contributions. Yet, the German government did not intend to deploy troops either in the DRC or in the wider region.¹⁰⁹ As a result, the decision-making process did not get off the ground at that time. While the Council General Secretariat (CGS) began to develop an option paper for a possible military operation, without clear political guidance, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) protracted the period prior to a political decision by tasking a fact-finding mission to the DRC for the end of January 2006.¹¹⁰

Following the fact-finding mission, the CGS option paper was amended and initially discussed in the PSC meeting on 13 February 2006. The paper was nevertheless

¹⁰⁷ Further information available at “CONSILIUM – EUSEC RD Congo,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=909&lang=en> (accessed 21 November 2009); Hoebeke, Stéphanie Carette and Koen Vlassenroot, *EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo*, 9–11.

¹⁰⁸ “Letter from the United Nations' Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 27 December 2005,” http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2400681/k.4C25/Publications_on_African_Is_sues.htm (accessed 21 January 2010).

¹⁰⁹ Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 238–240; G. Olsen, “The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa Or Europe?” *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 2 (2009), 253–254.

¹¹⁰ “Anders als der Balkan – Tauziehen um eine Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an einem Einsatz im Kongo,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 24 January 2006; “Optionenpapier für Kongo – Brüssel wertet Erkundungsmission aus,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 7 February 2006.

characterized by a “lack of operational-level input [that] hampered the politico-strategic planning.”¹¹¹ While the Operation Commander and his headquarters were not yet identified, the EU Military Staff was forced to act for the Operation Headquarters even though it did not have the expertise and means to do so. As a result, the paper proposed three nearly identical options for a military operation, which varied mainly regarding the strengths of deployed personnel (between 200 and 500) to the DRC’s capital city, Kinshasa. Beyond that, all options contained the common element of a rapidly deployable “on call” force (approximately 1,000 troops) based in Libreville, the capital city of the DRC’s neighbor country, Gabon. The main task of the European force (EUFOR) was to intervene, if necessary, in different parts of the DRC in order to secure the region during the electoral process.¹¹²

The CGS option paper and the subsequent deliberations among EU member states made clear that a military operation was both possible and appropriate. However, the most urgent problem regarding planning and decision making was still unsolved. Even though all member states seemed willing to launch a military operation, they remained unwilling to offer the needed military capabilities. This problem concerned, in particular, the question of available headquarters. The Operation Headquarters (OHQ) at the strategic level and the Force Headquarters (FHQ) in the area of operations were basically provided by France, Germany, Italy, or the United Kingdom.¹¹³ Yet, none of these countries indicated an offer of headquarters. Consequently, no political decision to take action was made.¹¹⁴

During the following weeks, the German government, in particular, came under increasing pressure. In comparison with the other major countries, the largest EU member

¹¹¹ Simon, *Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations*, 32.

¹¹² “Drei Optionen für den Kongo,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 14 February 2006; Ryjacek, *The Decision-Making Process on the Deployment of German Armed Forces for Protecting the Elections in Congo*, 225–226.

¹¹³ The Council can activate one of these headquarters, which need to be augmented by the member states in order to achieve operational capability.

¹¹⁴ “EU berät über Kongo-Einsatz,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 14 February 2006.

state appeared militarily most able to provide the OHQ at that time.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, the new German grand coalition government (CDU/CSU-SPD) did not seek leadership in this operation due to domestic political reasons. Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) and Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier (SPD) were fully aware of the fact that the idea of a military intervention in Africa was unpopular with the German public.¹¹⁶ Simultaneously, in Berlin, the suspicion was entertained that Paris and New York would arrange a deal behind the scenes that would give Germany no choice other than taking over the leading role.¹¹⁷ The decision-making process was prolonged until 14 March 2006, when the Franco-German ministerial meeting in Berlin led to an initial political compromise. Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Jacques Chirac agreed that France and Germany would each contribute a third (some 500 troops) of the requested forces.¹¹⁸ Some days later, the German government hesitantly accepted part of the leadership responsibility for the operation and offered its OHQ in Potsdam, while France announced its willingness to deploy the FHQ to Kinshasa.¹¹⁹

Afterwards, the Council approved the option paper and confirmed the guidelines for the EU military support during the electoral process in the DRC.¹²⁰ However, the delayed political decision to take action compressed the timeframe for further planning.¹²¹ The designated Operation Commander, German Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, was therefore tasked to develop the operational documents immediately.

¹¹⁵ France had provided the OHQ for Operation Artemis in 2003, while the United Kingdom was heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2006.

¹¹⁶ Simon, *Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations*, 33–34; “Weiter Bedenken wegen Kongo,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 9 March 2006.

¹¹⁷ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “EUFOR RD Congo: A Preliminary Assessment,” ISIS Europe, <http://isis-europe.org/index.php?page=esr> (accessed 22 November 2009).

¹¹⁸ “Merkel und Chirac für Mission im Kongo,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 14 March 2006.

¹¹⁹ “Ohne Plan in den Kongo,” *Die Welt*, sec. Politik, 21 March 2006.

¹²⁰ “République démocratique du Congo: le Conseil lance la planification en vue d'une opération de l'UE en soutien de la MONUC pendant le processus électoral, 23 March 2006, “CONSILIUM – Press Releases EUFOR RD Congo,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1092&lang=en> (accessed 22 November 2009).

¹²¹ Simon, *Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations*, 34–35. Fortunately, the European Union gained time due to the decision to delay the elections in the DRC. Without the electoral delay, the planning for EUFOR RD Congo would not have been completed in time.

For this reason, the EU skipped a crucial planning step and did not develop a crisis management concept.¹²² Because time was limited, the planning proceeded on the basis of a simple option paper.¹²³

Finally, on 25 April 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006) authorized the European Union to deploy forces in the DRC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to support MONUC during the electoral phase.¹²⁴ Two days later, the Council of the EU adopted the Joint Action that formed the EU's legal basis for Operation EUFOR RD Congo. According to the Council's decision, the operation was to be conducted "in full agreement with the authorities of the DRC and in close coordination with them and MONUC."¹²⁵ The main tasks of EUFOR were (1) to provide support to the United Nations in the DRC in order to stabilize a situation if MONUC faced serious difficulties, (2) to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger under imminent threat of physical violence in the area of its deployment, (3) to contribute to the airport protection in Kinshasa, (4) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and the protection of its installations, and (5) to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger. The Operation Commander was to maintain close cooperation with the Secretary General and High Representative (SG/HR) for the CFSP as well as with the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and MONUC.¹²⁶

The mission included the deployment of an advanced force element to Kinshasa, the availability of a battalion-size "on call" force, based out of the country in Libreville,

¹²² Fritsch, *EUFOR RD Congo: A Misunderstood Operation?* 32. The Option Paper was approved by the Council as a substitute for the CMC. Yet, the document did not provide a grand strategic plan in order to ensure full coherence between all involved civil and military EU actors.

¹²³ Major, *EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006*, 17; "EU billigt Kongo-Einsatz," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 25 March 2006.

¹²⁴ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006), 25 April 2006," http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm (accessed 22 November 2009).

¹²⁵ "Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, 27 April 2006," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1096&lang=en> (accessed 22 November 2009).

¹²⁶ "EU Military Operation in Support of the MONUC during the Election Process in RD Congo, 12 June 2006," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1092&lang=en> (accessed 22 November 2009).

Gabon, and a strategic reserve force “over the horizon” in Europe. The “on call” force was to be on stand-by, ready to be quickly deployed to the DRC upon a decision by the Council of the EU. Thereby, the European Union intended to ensure a deterrent capacity while avoiding an unnecessary heavy military presence in the DRC. The EU Force Commander, French Major General Christian Damay, and the FHQ were to be located in Kinshasa, operating in close coordination with the EU SR and the heads of mission of EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo and maintaining close contacts with MONUC, local authorities, and other international actors. Based on guidance documents, the Operation Commander was tasked to conduct the military strategic planning and to generate the requested forces in order to launch the operation no later than June 2006.¹²⁷

3. Force Generation and Mission Financing

The number of requested troops and capabilities had been significantly increased during the planning process. While initial planning had presented a number of 1,500 troops, EUFOR RD Congo finally requested 2,400 troops in the area of operations, including the advanced detachment (1,100 troops) in Kinshasa and the “on call” force (1,300 troops) in Libreville. Over and above these 2,400 troops, advanced planning assumed the need for a strategic reserve force “over the horizon” composed of 1,500 additional troops.¹²⁸ Against this background, the force generation task emerged as a huge challenge for the Operation Commander even though France and Germany had already indicated that each would provide some 500 troops. Despite the fact that nineteen EU member states and two non-EU states, Switzerland and Turkey, had promised further troop contributions, the list of shortfalls remained long, even after two force generation conferences held in Potsdam in May 2006. In particular, the provision of a strategic reserve force and some mission-critical capabilities (e.g., air support and medical evacuation assets) appeared problematic. Finally, the shortfalls were filled due to a Franco-German arrangement just prior to the Council’s decision to launch the operation.

¹²⁷ *CONSILIUM – Press Releases EUFOR RD Congo*, 4–6; Major, *EU–UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006*, 17–18.

¹²⁸ “Berlin schweigt zur Truppenzahl,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 11 May 2006.

While Germany agreed to provide some mission-critical capabilities, France offered the bulk of a strategic reserve force, including air support based in Chad.¹²⁹

As a result, Operation EUFOR RD Congo was launched by the Council on 12 June 2006.¹³⁰ The mission involved, as requested, 2,400 troops in the area of operation, contributed by twenty-one EU member states and two non-EU states (Switzerland and Turkey). The biggest contributors were France (1,090), followed by Germany (780), Poland and Spain (130 each), Belgium (60), and Sweden (55).¹³¹ In comparison with the force generation process, the issue of mission financing was smoothly handled by the EU member states. The operation drew on allocations paid by the troop contributing nations, according to the principle “costs lie where they fall,” while common costs were funded through the ATHENA mechanism.¹³² The latter were mainly related to the funding of headquarters and command, control, communications, and information (C³I) systems. The overall costs of the operation were approximately 100 million euros.¹³³

4. Conduct of Operations, Results, and Effects

Operation EUFOR RD Congo officially began on the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections, 30 July 2006. The deployment of forces, which had already been launched some weeks before, was carried out smoothly until mid August when EUFOR reached its full strength. The mission’s duration was limited to the

¹²⁹ “Mehr Soldaten für den Einsatz im Kongo,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 17 May 2006; “Schlüsselfähigkeiten fehlen noch im Kongo,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 16 May 2006; Major, *EU–UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006*, 18.

¹³⁰ “EU Military Operation in Support of the MONUC during the Election Process in RD Congo, 12 June 2006.”

¹³¹ Ehrhart, *EUFOR RD Congo: A Preliminary Assessment*; Gowan, *The EU's Multiple Strategic Identities: European Security After Lebanon and the Congo*, 75.

¹³² Further information available at “CONSILIUM – Financing of ESDP Operations “<http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=746&lang=en> (accessed 23 November 2009). ATHENA was set up by the Council on 1 March 2004 in order to administer the financing of common costs of EU-led military operations. The mechanism uses a gross domestic product calculator to share the burden among member states.

¹³³ Major, *EU–UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006*, 19.

four months following the first round of elections. During that time, EUFOR did not face serious military challenges and suffered no casualties. Nevertheless, it did employ troops on several occasions.¹³⁴

The most dangerous incident occurred between 20 and 22 August 2006, following the announcement of the results of the presidential elections' first round. The United Nations requested military support from the European Union when elements of Kabila's presidential guard attacked the residence of his most important rival, Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba, in which representatives of ICAT were also present. The EUFOR separated the conflicting parties in cooperation with MONUC, brought Bemba and the international representatives to safety, and reinforced its advanced detachment with 180 paratroopers from the "on call" force in Gabon. Against this background, EUFOR was strengthened with 300 troops of the strategic reserve force before the second round of the presidential elections on 29 October. The second poll took place without any serious violent incidents. As a result, the Supreme Court of the DRC declared Joseph Kabila the winner with 58 percent of the votes. Kabila was inaugurated as the new president on 6 December 2006.¹³⁵

All in all, the operation fulfilled the limited objectives of its mandate and played a complementary role within the concerted efforts of the United Nations and other organizations in the DRC. The EUFOR demonstrated its capacity to react quickly and used that capacity to assist MONUC in preventing the spread of violence at sensitive points in the electoral process. Consequently, it has been argued that the operation was a successful application of the "EU's commitment to 'effective multilateralism' by strengthening MONUC, and hence the UN, in a concrete situation."¹³⁶

However, the operation's effectiveness must also be assessed in the context of the EU's overall engagement in the DRC. In this regard, EUFOR's role during the electoral

¹³⁴ Bastian Giegerich, "EU Crisis Management: Ambitions and Achievements," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 397 (2008), 30–31.

¹³⁵ Ehrhart, *EUFOR RD Congo: A Preliminary Assessment*, 1–2; Major, *EU–UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006*, 19–20.

¹³⁶ Ehrhart, *EUFOR RD Congo: A Preliminary Assessment*, 3.

process was militarily defined, but not politically integrated into a grand strategic design delineating the potential lines of political, military and civil actions during the electoral process. Due to this omission, the military operation was not strategically interconnected with the civil ESDP missions and the Commission's activities in the DRC. Consequently, the coherence of the EU's actions in the field was strongly dependant on the personal cooperation between the EU Force Commander, the EU SR, the Commission's delegation, and the heads of mission of EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo. Even though this personal cooperation worked well, albeit with some shortcomings, "coordination by objective" proved hard to achieve "in the absence of clear and consistent guidelines for all relevant EU actors."¹³⁷

B. CASE STUDY: EUFOR TCHAD/RCA

1. Introduction

The war in Darfur has led to a human tragedy with at least 200,000 deaths and over 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDP). The violence started in 2003 when rebel movements accused the Sudanese government of the suppression of black Africans in favor of Arab Africans. Since then, the conflict between different black African rebel groups on the one hand and the Sudanese military and Afro-Arab militias on the other has spread over to Chad and to the Central African Republic (CAR). Not only refugees, but also the rebelling black African *Zaghawa*, crossed the border using eastern Chad and the northeast of the CAR as areas of retreat. In return, the military regime in Khartoum supported rebel groups in Chad, where the *Zaghawa* minority has power over the remaining 97 per cent of the population. As a result of these overlapping conflicts, in 2007 there were some 200,000 refugees from Darfur and 150,000 Chadian displaced persons in eastern Chad, and another 200,000 refugees from Darfur in the northeast of the CAR.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Giovanni Grevi, *Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU Special Representatives* (Western European Union: Institute for Security Studies, 2007), quotation p. 116; Bjorn Olav Knutsen, *The EU and the Challenges of Civil-Military Coordination at the Strategic Level* (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2008), 46–48.

¹³⁸ Arteaga, *The Chad Conflict, United Nations (MINURCAT) and the European Union (EUFOR)*, 1–3.

Against this background, a joint African Union (AU)—United Nations (UN) hybrid operation in Darfur, called UNAMID, was organized in spring 2007.¹³⁹ The new mission, aiming to improve the security situation in Darfur with almost 20,000 troops, gained Sudanese acceptance in June 2007.¹⁴⁰ However, the UN Secretary General's call for an additional mission in Darfur's border regions was rejected by the Chadian President Idriss Deby. The French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, therefore proposed an EU-led military operation to assist a civil UN mission in eastern Chad and the northeast of the CAR.¹⁴¹

2. Planning and Decision Making

At French initiative, the European Commission and Council General Secretariat developed a joint option paper on possible EU actions in Darfur and its border regions for an initial discussion in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in June 2007. The discussion made clear, from the very beginning, that a consensus among EU member states was a distant prospect.¹⁴² First of all, there were concerns with regard to the national interests that might be involved. The former colonial power in Chad and the CAR, France, supported the Chadian government even though it had disagreements with Deby's authoritarian regime concerning democratization and human rights. Some 1,100 French troops were providing intelligence, logistics, and air support to the Chadian armed forces and keeping up the military balance at the expense of rebel groups.¹⁴³

In addition, the French proposal encountered reservations because some member states, in particular Germany and the United Kingdom, wanted to focus their efforts on

¹³⁹ The acronym UNAMID stands for United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur.

¹⁴⁰ "UNAMID: African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur" <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/background.html> (accessed 19 September 2009).

¹⁴¹ M. Pabst, "Chad: EUFOR in the 'Wild East'," *Europäische Sicherheit* 57, no. 4 (2008), 32.

¹⁴² "Darfur–Initiative Kouchners – in der EU Skepsis über den Vorstoss," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 18 June 2007.

¹⁴³ Arteaga, *The Chad Conflict, United Nations (MINURCAT) and the European Union (EUFOR)*, 3–4; Hans-Georg Ehrhart, "EU-Krisenmanagement in Afrika: Die Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA," *Integration*, no. 2 (2008), 26–27; Alexander Mattelaer, *The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations: The Case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA* (Brussels: The Institute for European Studies, 2008), 9–10, <http://www.ies.be/WorkingPapers> (accessed 21 September 2009).

Darfur. Due to the fact that UNAMID had huge problems in generating the requested forces, the UN called for additional EU contributions to the hybrid operation.¹⁴⁴ In this respect, the launch of an EU-led military operation in that region might have jeopardized the simultaneous build-up of UNAMID. Owing to these concerns, the PSC did not reach an agreement about rapid military action in June 2007 as had been proposed by France.¹⁴⁵

While the joint option paper was being amended and then evaluated by the EU Military Committee, the French Foreign Minister travelled to N'Djamena. He persuaded President Deby to accept the deployment of European Union forces to assist a UN humanitarian mission and a domestic police detachment in eastern Chad. Subsequently, the UN Security Council authorized, at French initiative, the development of a multidimensional international commitment consisting of three parts: humanitarian, police, and military. The United Nations took care of the first component and Chad the second with UN support. The mission would be conducted in eastern Chad and the northeast of the CAR, where refugees and other displaced people were located. The chief task would be to help maintain order in the refugee camps. Armed forces were to assist the police, but a military presence on the Chadian and CAR borders with Darfur was excluded.¹⁴⁶ Based on this condition, the EU member states approved the European Union's involvement in the UN mission during the meeting of the Council of the EU on 23–24 July 2007.¹⁴⁷

However, one week before, Germany and the United Kingdom had signaled that they would not contribute with forces in theatre, but would agree to the launch of a timely limited operation. In contrast, France made arrangements for deploying 1,500 troops as a core element of a European Union force in Chad and the CAR, supplemented by detachments from several member states, including Austria, Finland, Italy, Spain, and

¹⁴⁴ Jean M. Guehenno, "Europas Ignoranz ist erschreckend," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 8 May 2007; Pabst, *Chad: EUFOR in the "Wild East"*, 32.

¹⁴⁵ "Darfur-Initiative Kouchners – in der EU Skepsis über den Vorstoss."

¹⁴⁶ Arteaga, *The Chad Conflict, United Nations (MINURCAT) and the European Union (EUFOR)*, 4.

¹⁴⁷ "Council Conclusions on Sudan/Darfur, 2817th External Relations Council Meeting, 23–24 July 2007," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1368&lang=EN> (accessed 19 September 2009).

Sweden.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the new French government's way of preparing the ESDP operation had led to irritation in some European capitals.¹⁴⁹

According to the crisis management concept (CMC), which was adopted by the Council of the EU on 12 September 2007, the possible ESDP operation was part of a comprehensive approach designed to enhance the EU's commitment to handling the crisis in Darfur and neighboring regions.¹⁵⁰ The three main elements comprised: a) increased support for AU and UN efforts to revitalize the peace process in Darfur, b) acceleration of the deployment of UNAMID, and c) increased funding of humanitarian aid and securing humanitarian access to crisis areas.¹⁵¹ In this context, the European Commission contributed ten million euros under the Instrument for Stability to finance UN programs designed to train, equip, and support the deployment of Chadian police responsible for security in refugee camps in eastern Chad. Additionally, the European Commission provided money for the construction of return zones for displaced persons under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF). The accompanying program for stabilization provided almost 300 million euros in Chad and 137 million euros in the CAR for the period 2008–2013.¹⁵²

In this framework, the EU planned a military bridging operation deployed in Darfur's border regions for the duration of one year. Coordinated closely with the multidimensional UN presence, the strategic objective was to contribute to the improvement of security in the crisis triangle of Darfur, eastern Chad, and the northeast of the CAR. The CMC addressed the concerns regarding the possible involvement of French national interests by stressing the neutrality and impartiality of the European Union force. The mission therefore explicitly excluded border patrol and intervention in

¹⁴⁸ "Frankreich zum Tschad-Einsatz entschlossen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 18 July 2007.

¹⁴⁹ "Ärger und Verwunderung über Sarkozy," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 28 July 2007.

¹⁵⁰ Arteaga, *The Chad Conflict, United Nations (MINURCAT) and the European Union (EUFOR)*, 4.

¹⁵¹ "EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and Northern Eastern CAR, updated March 2009," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1369&lang=EN> (19 September 2009).

¹⁵² "The EU's Actions in the Context of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, 8 December 2008," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1369&lang=EN> (accessed 19 September 2009).

combat between Chadian troops and rebel groups. The European Union force was to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own, UN, and associated personnel.¹⁵³

Based on the decision by the Council of the EU on 12 September, the Secretary General and High Representative, Javier Solana, reported to the UN Secretary General that the European Union was willing to conduct the mission's military component for the first year.¹⁵⁴ Two weeks later, the UN Security Council authorized the multidimensional mission in Chad and the CAR, called MINURCAT,¹⁵⁵ for the duration of one year. The MINURCAT mission, comprised of 300 police officers, 50 liaison officers, and a number of civilian officials, was to address the humanitarian problems in the region by providing police stabilization and humanitarian assistance. The designated European Union military component was authorized to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and to use force if necessary.¹⁵⁶

On 15 October 2007, the Council of the EU adopted the Joint Action on the Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, after France had offered its Operation Headquarters (OHQ) at Mont Valerien, the Force Headquarters (FHQ) in theatre, and the Force Commander, Brigadier General Jean-Philippe Ganascia. In order to give the operation a European Union "face," Irish Lieutenant General Patrick Nash was appointed EU Operation Commander.¹⁵⁷ He took over responsibility for the subsequent military strategic planning and the force generation process.

¹⁵³ "CONSILIUM – Background/Articles EUFOR Tchad/RCA," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1369&lang=EN> (19 September, 2009).

¹⁵⁴ Arteaga, *The Chad Conflict, United Nations (MINURCAT) and the European Union (EUFOR)*, 4.

¹⁵⁵ The acronym stands for Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad (MINURCAT).

¹⁵⁶ "The UN Security Council Resolution 1778/2007, 25 September 2007," http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm (accessed 19 September 2009).

¹⁵⁷ "Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP, 15 October 2007," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1367&lang=EN> (accessed 19 September 2009).

3. Force Generation and Mission Funding

The reluctance of Germany, the United Kingdom, and other EU member states to participate in the military operation in Chad had made clear that the force generation process would create a huge challenge for the Operation Commander. The first informal force inquiries had led to the less than encouraging result of 1,500 offered troops.¹⁵⁸ The evaluation of the prioritized military strategic options had to consider this less than auspicious prospect of support. Against this background, the European Union decided to design an operation with some 4,000 troops, notwithstanding the vast extension of the area of operations. The limited number of troops was to be balanced by the sufficient presence of high value capabilities such as air mobility and long-range reconnaissance.¹⁵⁹

Until mid October 2007, when the force generation process was to be accomplished, the EU member states had offered only 2,500 troops, including 1,500 from France. However, the French government was interested in the European Union appearance of the operation. France's political target was therefore to generate at least 50 per cent of the required forces from other member states.¹⁶⁰ While EU and French officials pushed for additional contributions to EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the force generation process stalled for three months. Finally, the fifth force generation conference led to a breakthrough in mid January 2008 when France offered an additional 600 troops and mission-critical assets. As a result, EUFOR was comprised of 3,700 troops from fourteen member states, including France (2,100), Ireland (400), Poland (400), Sweden (200), Austria (180), and Belgium (120).¹⁶¹ The outcome of the force generation process was sobering for the EU and its member states. In particular, the French government did not reach its target of generating at least 50 per cent of the forces from other countries.

¹⁵⁸ "EU fehlen Soldaten für Tschad-Truppe," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 25 September 2007.

¹⁵⁹ Ehrhart, *EU-Krisenmanagement in Afrika: Die Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA*, 29. Three military strategic options with different numbers of personnel were considered: option A) 3,000, option B) 4,000, and option C) 8,000.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁶¹ "Füllt Paris die Lücken in der Tschad-Truppe?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 11 January 2008; Arteaga, *The Chad Conflict, United Nations (MINURCAT) and the European Union (EUFOR)*, 5.

However, the operation achieved an EU “look” due to the fact that most member states sent personnel to the OHQ and FHQ. Germany and the United Kingdom, for example, were each present with four staff officers. Consequently, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA was able to gain a multinational character.¹⁶²

The Operation Commander and other EU officials were nevertheless dissatisfied with the results of the force generation effort. Although most of EUFOR’s personnel requirements were met, significant shortfalls remained in strategic reserve forces and high value capabilities, in particular with regard to helicopters and medical, transport, and intelligence assets. Up until the fifth force generation conference, the French government had hoped that Germany would fill the gaps. The government in Berlin nonetheless remained unwilling to contribute with forces in theatre because the whole purpose of the operation appeared doubtful from its point of view.¹⁶³

In addition, the efforts by Germany, the United Kingdom, and other member states to limit the operation’s common costs to 100 million euros irritated the French. Due to the fact that overall costs of 400 to 500 million euros were estimated, France feared that it would have to pay the lion’s share of the operation’s expense. After lengthy negotiations in which the member states eventually agreed to grant commonly up to 120 million euros, the French apprehension became, in fact, reality.¹⁶⁴ The European Union, however, reached a position in which it was ready to launch the operation. Over and above the EU commitment of forces and resources, the designated participation of third states, in particular Russia, which promised to contribute helicopters, appeared likely to fill some crucial capability gaps.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² “Summary of Remarks by Lt General Patrick Nash, Operation Commander EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Press Conference, Brussels, 29 January 2008,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1368&lang=EN> (19 September 2009).

¹⁶³ “Fuelled Paris Die Luecken in Der Tschad-Truppe?”

¹⁶⁴ “La Force Europeenne en Centrafrique et au Tchad sera a Dominante Francaise,” *Le Monde (Paris)*, sec. Politik, 12 January 2008; “L’Union Europeenne lance l’operation Eufor au Tchad et en Centrafrique,” *Le Monde (Paris)*, sec. Politik, 30 January 2008; Ehrhart, *EU-Krisenmanagement in Afrika: Die Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA*, 29.

¹⁶⁵ “Russland verspricht Hubschrauber für Tschad-Einsatz,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 12 January 2008.

4. Conduct of Operations, Results, and Effects

The Council of the EU's decision to launch the operation on 28 January 2008,¹⁶⁶ hardly three months later than expected, was not only the trigger for the deployment of the European Union force, but also the signal for a joint rebel offensive against the Chadian capital city. Insurgent forces with more than 300 vehicles and 1,500 fighters successfully mounted a raid from the Sudanese border to N'Djamena, entered the city, attacked the Chadian forces, and besieged the president's palace for 36 hours. Due to the deteriorating security situation, the French government reinforced its national-led forces in Chad, called Operation Epervier, and conducted an evacuation operation. In a few days, more than 800 people of 27 nationalities were brought to safety. In this situation, the French forces did not engage directly in combat in favor of President Deby, but provided logistical and intelligence support to the Chadian troops.¹⁶⁷

The operational role of the French forces created problems with regard to EUFOR. While the European Union frequently stressed the neutrality and impartiality of its engagement in Chad, the major troop-contributing nation (that is, France) did not exclude the possibility of a military intervention against the rebel coalition.¹⁶⁸ This situation not only caused irritation—for example, among other participating EU member states and non-governmental humanitarian actors—but also presented a huge challenge for the EU Force Commander and his troops in theatre. The EUFOR had to draw a clear dividing line for Operation Epervier and prove its neutrality and impartiality.¹⁶⁹

Despite a colossal logistical challenge, EUFOR achieved an initial operational capability (IOC) on the ground with a multinational initial entry force and the French

¹⁶⁶ "Council Decision 2008/101/CFSP on the Launching of the European Union Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA), 28 January 2008," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1367&lang=EN> (accessed 19 September 2009).

¹⁶⁷ Tull, *The Chad Crisis and Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR*, 4; Arteaga, *The Chad Conflict, United Nations (MINURCAT) and the European Union (EUFOR)*, 6–7.

¹⁶⁸ "Rebellen bieten Waffenstillstand an," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 6 February 2008.

¹⁶⁹ Brune, *Controversial Peacekeeping Operations – Europe, France and Chad*, 22–23; Arteaga, *The Chad Conflict, United Nations (MINURCAT) and the European Union (EUFOR)*, 7–9; Pabst, *Chad: EUFOR in the "Wild East"*, 33–34.

maneuver battalion on 15 March 2008. Six months later, once the deployment of the Irish and Polish maneuver battalions had been accomplished, the Operation Commander, Lieutenant General Nash, declared full operating capability (FOC).¹⁷⁰ However, EUFOR's operational effectiveness was still limited due to significant shortfalls. One major concern of the Operation Commander was the lack of air assets. In this respect, the deployment of four Russian helicopters did not take place until December 2008.¹⁷¹

Nevertheless, the three maneuver battalions conducted short-range patrols and large-scale operations in order to improve security by expanding their presence in eastern Chad and the northeast of the CAR. The EUFOR enabled MINURCAT to become operational over its entire area of responsibility. In addition, EU troops helped the population by providing medical consultations and deactivating unexploded ordnance. According to the European Union, the improvement of the security situation, along with the European Commission's measures for the construction of return zones, made it possible for at least 10,000 people to return to their villages. In this context, the humanitarian assistance provided to refugees, displaced persons, and host communities by the European Commission added expenses of up to 30 million euros. Furthermore, within the framework of the strategy for cooperation with Chad, the European Commission continued its development assistance program by funding health support and water supply projects in eastern Chad with 42 million euros.¹⁷²

Despite these facts, the general security situation remained fragile. Fierce fighting between rebel groups and Chadian forces in the border regions continued during the presence of EUFOR and threatened the local population and displaced persons. The EU Force Commander, Brigadier General Ganascia, and his troops nonetheless credibly preserved EUFOR's neutrality and impartiality during the fighting and protected refugee camps, MINURCAT personnel, and humanitarian workers within their means and

¹⁷⁰ Further information available at "CONSILIUM – News in Brief EUFOR Tchad/RCA," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1373&lang=en> (accessed 22 September 2009).

¹⁷¹ "The EU's Actions in the Context of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, 8 December 2008." Additionally, a Croatian reconnaissance unit and an Albanian protection element reinforced EUFOR.

¹⁷² "EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and Northern Eastern CAR, updated March 2009."

capabilities.¹⁷³ Despite their efforts, 120 attacks against humanitarian organizations occurred and six humanitarian workers were killed in 2008. Moreover, crime and banditry remained a serious threat in the border regions.¹⁷⁴

From the time the operation was launched, it was clear that an international follow-on force should take over the mission twelve months after the declaration of its IOC. After tedious negotiations, in October 2008, President Deby accepted the build-up of a MINURCAT military component with up to 5,200 soldiers.¹⁷⁵ Afterwards, a number of troop-contributing nations decided to remain on the ground with MINURCAT. Besides that, the EU agreed to hand over campsites and equipment to the follow-on force. Additionally, the European Community (EC) was willing to continue its long-term assistance to Chad and the CAR. In order to establish enduring stability in the region, the European Commission undertook action to promote the rule of law, economic recovery, good governance, and reform of the justice and security sectors, with the aim to sustain assistance at least until 2013. Finally, the European Union declared it would continue its political and humanitarian efforts in Darfur.¹⁷⁶

On 15 March 2009, EUFOR Tchad/RCA accomplished its bridging mission when a military ceremony in Abeche, Chad, marked the handover of authority to MINURCAT. Around 2,000 EU troops were “rehatted” and continued to serve in the region under the UN flag.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ “Tschadischer Praesident Kritisiert Schutztruppe,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 18 June 2008.

¹⁷⁴ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Zwischenbilanz und Empfehlungen für eine effektivere Konfliktlösung,” *Integration*, no. 1 (2009), 400–401.

¹⁷⁵ “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, s/2008/760, 4 December 2008,” <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm> (accessed 22 September 2009).

¹⁷⁶ “The EU's Actions in the Context of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, 8 December 2008”; “CONSILIUM – News in Brief EUFOR Tchad/RCA.”

¹⁷⁷ “La MINURCAT prend la Suite De l'EUFOR au Tchad et en Centrafrique, 16 March 2009,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1368&lang=EN> (accessed 19 September 2009); “CONSILIUM – News in Brief EUFOR Tchad/RCA.”

C. CASE STUDY: EUNAVFOR SOMALIA

1. Introduction

In 2008, piracy off the Horn of Africa became a major global concern. While it had been a local problem in Somali territorial waters for at least ten years, the number of pirate attacks doubled from 2007 to 2008 and switched from the shoreline into the high seas off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. The upsurge in piracy posed a rising threat to commercial fishing and merchant shipping and necessitated the protection of humanitarian aid designated for the Somali population, and the displacement of sea traffic further away into international waters. The high level of piracy forced, for example, the World Food Program (WFP) to temporarily suspend food deliveries to the port of Mogadishu until different nations agreed to provide timely limited naval escorts.¹⁷⁸ Overall, 111 piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast were reported in 2008 according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). Of those attacks, 46 resulted in the seizure of commercial vessels by pirates.¹⁷⁹

The Somali piracy evolved into a serious threat due to several interrelated factors. First, the continued absence of a reliable and functioning government in Mogadishu meant that Somalia was incapable of taking action against piracy and armed robbery at sea. The country's internal unrest and the power of local warlords and clan leaders created a favorable situation for organized crime. The critical maritime route through the Gulf of Aden connecting the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean represented a potentially lucrative target in this context. Additionally, the collapse of state authorities opened the coast of Somalia to uncontrolled foreign exploitation. Large commercial fishing vessels

¹⁷⁸ J. Ndumbe Anyu and Samuel Moki, "Africa: The Piracy Hot Spot and its Implications for Global Security," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 20, no. 3 (summer 2009), 102–105; Patrick Lennox, "Contemporary Piracy Off the Horn of Africa," <http://www.cdfai.org/publicationsauthor.htm> (accessed 3 September 2010); Roger Middleton, "Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars," Chatham House Briefing Paper, October 2008, <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/665/> (accessed 3 September 2010); Eric Pardo Sauvageot, "Piracy Off Somalia and its Challenges to Maritime Security: Problems and Solutions," *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, no 19, no. 19 (January 2009), 251–252.

¹⁷⁹ "Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – IMB Piracy Annual Report 2008," <http://www.dmkn.de/1779/maritime-sicherheit.nsf/3c26e7f55f24138ac125691800380650/303c68d205fc450cc125754a003a390e!OpenDocument> (accessed 3 September 2010).

from distant nations gained access to traditional domestic fishing areas and destroyed by degrees the regular livelihood of coastal village communities. The first incidents of piracy occurred when Somali fishermen began to board foreign vessels and accuse their crews of fishing illegally. While piracy initially involved “taxing” maritime traffic, especially fishing vessels, it subsequently led to hijacking of merchant ships and kidnapping their crews. Furthermore, new means became available to pirate groups that simultaneously evolved into full-fledged criminal ventures. In particular, the use of “mother ships” represented a major tactical and logistic innovation. Instead of using skiffs whose operating range was limited to the coastal waters, pirate groups began to employ “mother ships.” These ships transported skiffs to the high seas where big catches such as oil tankers and container ships became new prey for pirates. As a result, piracy off the Horn of Africa appeared on the international security agenda.¹⁸⁰

The UN Security Council expressed its concerns on the deteriorating security situation off the Somali coast with the adoption of three resolutions on the subject within four months in 2008. The UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1801 and 1814, adopted on 20 February and 15 May 2008, only mentioned piracy among other threats in calling for a comprehensive approach to address the situation in Somalia.¹⁸¹ In contrast, UNSCR 1816, adopted with the consent of the transitional government of Somalia (TGS) on 2 June 2008, dealt particularly with the issue of piracy and armed robbery. Due to the lack of security capacity of the TGS, the resolution authorized foreign war ships to “enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery” for an initial period of six months. The resolution also recommended cooperation between the involved states “in determining jurisdiction and the investigation

¹⁸⁰ Bruno Mpondo-Epo, “Root Causes of Piracy in Somalia,” *RSIS Commentaries* 2009 (Jun 1, 2009), 3; Sauvageot, *Piracy Off Somalia and its Challenges to Maritime Security: Problems and Solutions*, 252–253; Gary E. Weir, “Fish, Family, and Profit: Piracy and the Horn of Africa,” *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009), 16–21.

¹⁸¹ “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1801 (2008), 20 February 2008,” <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscreolutions08.htm> (accessed 3 September 2010); “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1814 (2008), 15 May 2008,” <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscreolutions08.htm> (accessed 3 September 2010); Steve Haines, “The New Piracy: The Legal Context,” *Survival* 52, no. 1 (2010), 50.

and prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery.”¹⁸² In brief, UNSCR 1816 paved the way for new international efforts in fighting piracy off Somalia due to the absence of a near-term regional solution.¹⁸³

2. Planning and Decision Making

Among the EU member states, there was a common perception that piracy and armed robbery off the Horn of Africa needed to be addressed. In response to the deteriorating security situation, the Council of the EU in June 2008 asked the Council General Secretariat (CGS) and the European Commission to study possible options in order to contribute to the implementation of UNSCR 1816. However, opinion was divided between those member states that preferred the launch of a full-fledged EU-led maritime operation and those that advocated a simple coordination mission that left military assets under national authority.¹⁸⁴

In particular, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, holder of the rotating EU presidency between July and December 2008, argued for an anti-piracy operation under the flag of the European Union. France had been one of the main drivers behind the adoption of UNSCR 1816 advocating the establishment of an international anti-piracy force off the Horn of Africa. It had responded rapidly and robustly to the Somali piracy challenge whenever French interests were involved. Besides that, France pushed for an EU-led maritime operation, aiming at strengthening and enhancing the ESDP with a true naval dimension. The operation would include the deployment of naval and air assets off the coast of Somalia with an EU command and control structure and would allow the European Union to gain experience in a new domain of crisis management operations.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008), 2 June 2008,” http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions08.htm (accessed 3 September 2010).

¹⁸³ Bjoern H. Seibert, “Of Pirates and Protectors,” *RUSI Newsbrief* 29, no. 3 (2009), 15, <http://www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/issue:I49C3819241D6B/> (accessed 19 September 2009).

¹⁸⁴ Basil Germond and Michael E. Smith, “Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU's Anti-Piracy Operation,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 3 (2009), 582–583; Romain Yakemtchouk, “European Union States Confronted by Somali Maritime Piracy,” *Revue Du Marche Commun Et De l'Union Europeenne*, no. 530 (July–August 2009), 441–445.

¹⁸⁵ Germond and Smith, *Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU's Anti-Piracy Operation*, 583–584; Weir, *Fish, Family, and Profit: Piracy and the Horn of Africa*, 23.

France was supported by member states with considerable merchant or fishing fleets such as Greece and Spain, which also faced domestic pressure to protect their maritime interests off the Horn of Africa. Due to the importance of the economic and security interests at hand, an EU-led maritime operation represented a bargain to demonstrate the capacity to act of the European Union and its member states.¹⁸⁶

On the other hand, the United Kingdom preferred the initiation of an EU coordination mission, comprised of small staff elements in Brussels and the crisis region. While the mission was to coordinate force generation, information, and escort organization, military assets would remain under national authority. The British government was reluctant to endorse the launch of an EU-led maritime operation because it wanted to avoid challenging the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the only existing Euro-Atlantic organization competent in naval operations.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, the United Kingdom and—to some degree—the Netherlands believed that NATO would be more effective for anti-piracy action. In fact, at the same time as the European Union, NATO prepared the deployment of warships off the Horn of Africa at the request of the United Nations. The operation, named Allied Provider, aimed at providing temporary protection for WFP assistance shipments in the region. On 24 October 2008, NATO deployed five warships from Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, and the United Kingdom to provide close protection of WFP vessels and to patrol shipping routes off the Somali coast.¹⁸⁸

In contrast to the countries listed above, Germany did not commit itself to one option at an early stage. An EU-led maritime operation off the Somali coast presented no obvious advantages at first glance. The German Navy was already participating in the US-led anti-terrorism operation Enduring Freedom near the Horn of Africa and NATO's naval operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO was competent,

¹⁸⁶ Seibert, *Of Pirates and Protectors*, 15.

¹⁸⁷ "Deutsche Marine soll Piraten vor Afrika jagen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 26 July 2008; Germond and Smith, *Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU's Anti-Piracy Operation*, 585.

¹⁸⁸ Joashua H. Ho, "Piracy Around the Horn of Africa," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 21, no. 4 (2009), 506–507; Lauren Ploch, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa* (Washington: Congressional Research Service [2009]), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf (accessed 3 September 2010).

flexible, and entirely capable of undertaking anti-piracy action. Yet, the attentive public in Germany—as that in other EU member states—increasingly criticized these two operations as a means to please the United States rather than to serve the European Union’s security interests. Policy-makers in Berlin therefore feared that the launch of another NATO-led operation at sea could lead to unnecessary controversial domestic debates.¹⁸⁹

Furthermore, the German government faced huge legal problems that needed to be addressed prior to the planning of any anti-piracy operation, whether conducted by the European Union or NATO. Due to constitutional constraints, the German Navy was—in contrast to many other navies—not generally authorized to combat piracy on the high seas. Therefore, a sound legal framework for the use of military force against acts of piracy and armed robbery was required in addition to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and UNSCR 1816. After detailed debates in Berlin, Germany’s grand coalition government eventually agreed upon the required legal conditions and decided to support the initiation of an EU-led anti-piracy operation.¹⁹⁰

Afterwards, the United Kingdom smoothly began to adjust its position. Although London would have still preferred a NATO operation, in British eyes, it would be disadvantageous to be the “odd one out” when France, Germany, Spain, and other EU member states engineered an arrangement. Due to the United Kingdom’s rank as a major naval power, British credibility on the high seas demanded participation. Accordingly, London switched tactics to argue for both an EU coordination mission with immediate effect and, subsequently, an EU-led maritime operation. This British turn paved the way for a general agreement among the EU member states. Moreover, it made it possible for the United Kingdom to take a leading role in the planning and conduct of the first maritime operation under the aegis of the European Union.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ “Deutsche Marine soll Piraten vor Afrika jagen,” Germond and Smith, *Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU’s Anti-Piracy Operation*, 584–585.

¹⁹⁰ “EU bereitet Militäreinsatz gegen Seeräuber vor,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 23 August 2008; Haines, *The New Piracy: The Legal Context*, 50–53.

¹⁹¹ Germond and Smith, *Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU’s Anti-Piracy Operation*, 585–586.

At its meeting on 15 September 2008, the Council of the EU agreed upon its approach to address piracy off the Horn of Africa. It decided to promptly establish an EU Naval Coordination Cell (EU NAVCO) in Brussels with the task “of supporting the surveillance and protection activities carried out by some member states off the Somali coast.”¹⁹² Furthermore, the Council of the EU agreed to press forward with the planning work on a maritime operation. The EU NAVCO was to establish a connection with the United Nations, World Food Program, humanitarian agencies, and maritime organizations in order to facilitate coordinated support by EU member states. It was additionally to liaise with relevant military actors in the Horn of Africa region such as NATO and the US-led Coalition Task Forces (CTF 150—Operation Enduring Freedom, and CTF 151—Counter-Piracy off Somalia). Finally, it was to be prepared to hand over its coordination tasks seamlessly to an EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) once the European Union launched the subsequent operation. The EU NAVCO resumed work under the leadership of the Spanish Navy Captain Andrés A. Breijo Claúr before the end of September 2008.¹⁹³

Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia was planned to serve as a part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to the Somali crisis embedded in the “Joint Strategy Paper” for the country for the period 2008–2013. Somalia was considered “a test case for the stabilization of the broader Horn of Africa region.”¹⁹⁴ The EU’s overall objective was to help establish a peaceful and secure environment in Somalia and to reduce poverty by providing humanitarian aid and increasing economic activity. The “Somalia Joint Strategy Paper” made available 215.8 million euros under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF). In this context, the European Union supported the Djibouti process for peace and reconciliation and the African Union’s mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Under its Instrument of Stability, the European Commission assisted the

¹⁹² “Council Conclusions on Somalia at the 2888th General Affairs Council Meeting, 15 September 2008,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1520&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010).

¹⁹³ “Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP, 19 September 2008,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1519&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010).

¹⁹⁴ “Somalia Joint Strategy Paper for the Period 2008–2013,” http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/methodologies/strategypapers10_en.cfm#pw (accessed 12 March 2010).

establishment of basic operational capacities for the transitional state institutions in Somalia. Simultaneously, the European Union and some of its member states supported the African Union (AU) in terms of financing, planning, and capacity building for AMISOM. These commitments made the European Union the single largest donor to Somalia.¹⁹⁵

However, the efforts by the European Union and other international actors could only aim at helping solve the underlying problems of Somalia's instability in the long run. This fact had a huge impact on the planning work for Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia. It was clear that any sustainable solution for the piracy threat in the Horn of Africa region required addressing lawlessness in Somalia. In the absence of a short-term regional solution ashore, the deployment of naval assets could, hence, only address the consequences, but not the roots of the piracy problem.¹⁹⁶ Under the given circumstances, the Council of the EU limited the political-military objective for the EU's anti-piracy operation. The deployment of naval assets under the EU flag aimed at helping improve the maritime security in the region by deterring, preventing, and repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast for an initial period of one year. The EUNAVFOR was to provide escort to vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to Somalia, protect vulnerable shipping in the Gulf of Aden, establish surveillance in pirate operating zones, and liaise with all relevant actors in the region. It was authorized to "take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent, and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery."¹⁹⁷

A credible deterrence posture demanded, inter alia, the capacities to board and seize pirate vessels, detain and transfer suspects, and prosecute pirates and armed robbers. A key complicating issue was the fact that these competencies fell into the domain of the EU member states. The legally compliant provision of these capacities

¹⁹⁵ "EU Naval Operation Against Piracy (EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta), 22 June 2009," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1521&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010).

¹⁹⁶ James Kraska and Brian Wilson, "Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword," *World Policy Journal* 25, no. 4 (Winter 2008), 47.

¹⁹⁷ "Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, 10 November 2008," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1519&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010).

needed to be ensured prior to the launch of any forceful anti-piracy action. Even though this was to be an EU-led maritime operation, domestic legislation played a major role in the planning work at the political and strategic levels. Legal uncertainties concerned particularly the “hot pursuit” of suspects into Somali territorial waters and the prosecution of pirates and armed robbers by EU member states and third states.¹⁹⁸ The first problem was solved in November 2008 by reaching an agreement with the TGS that authorized EU-led naval forces not only to enter Somali territorial waters, but also to detain and transfer suspects.¹⁹⁹ The second problem was addressed by two different approaches. First, the flag state of naval forces that detained suspects could attempt to prosecute these individuals by domestic courts. The flag state, however, faced the risks that domestic courts could decline jurisdiction over the matter and that suspects could seek asylum under international humanitarian law once in the country. This approach was thus both practically and legally problematic and, furthermore, not applicable to all EU member states due to the absence of the required national legislation.²⁰⁰

As a result, the European Union and other international actors pursued the implementation of a second, less problematic solution: the prosecution of pirates by countries in the neighborhood of Somalia. As Kenya was the closest country with the required competence and legislation, the Council General Secretariat, adopting a policy similar to that of the United Kingdom and the United States, pressed ahead on negotiations with the government in Nairobi. In November 2008, the United Nations supplemented these efforts and sponsored an international working group meeting in Nairobi to consider new legal and political approaches to combat piracy. The working

¹⁹⁸ Jian-jun Zhang, “International Law Issues for Curbing Somali Piracy,” *Xiandai Faxue/Modern Law Science* 31, no. 4 (July 2009), 138–144; Haines, *The New Piracy: The Legal Context*, 50; Bjoern H. Seibert, “The EU Takes on the Pirates of Puntland,” *RUSI Newsbrief* 28, no. 11 (2008), 104.

¹⁹⁹ “Letter from the Prime Minister of the TGS to the SG/HR in Response to the EU's Cooperation Offer, 1 November 2008,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1519&lang=en> (accessed 3/13/2010); “Notification by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia of this Offer to the UN Secretary General, 14 November 2008,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1519&lang=en> (accessed 3/13/2010); “Agreement between the European Union and the Somali Republic on the Status of the EU-Led Naval Forces in the Somali Republic, 15 January 2009,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1519&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010).

²⁰⁰ Roger Middleton, “Pirates and how to Deal with them,” Chatham House Briefing Note, 22 April 2009, <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/733/> (accessed 12 March 2010); Seibert, *The EU Takes on the Pirates of Puntland*, 104–105.

group identified, inter alia, a lasting need for coordinated international anti-piracy action and permanent arrangements ensuring the prosecution of pirates and armed robbers by third states in the Horn of Africa region. The UNSCR 1851, adopted on 16 December 2008, embraced these recommendations and facilitated the ratification of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Council of the EU and the government of Kenya in March 2009.²⁰¹ The European Commission contributed decisively to the conclusion of the MOU by providing financial and logistical support to the prosecution department of the Kenyan government. It included, additionally, financial support to the security of maritime routes in its indicative program for 2009–2011.²⁰²

3. Force Generation and Mission Financing

While the international and intergovernmental negotiations over the legal issues were being conducted, the Council General Secretariat and the EU member states looked for an EU Operation Headquarters. After its agreement to the initiation of an EU-led maritime operation off the Somali coast, the United Kingdom became increasingly interested in a leading role in the European efforts to tackle piracy. Naval operations were not only a longstanding area of British competence and tradition; the command over this operation promised also high international visibility with low costs. However, both policy-makers and the public in the United Kingdom remained generally hesitant regarding the EU's military aspirations. It therefore proved to be a difficult decision for the government in London to offer its Operation Headquarters in Northwood. The United Kingdom's most important allies, France, Germany, and the United States, preferred Northwood for different reasons. After the activation of the Operation Headquarters in Potsdam and Mont Valerien for the two most recent EU-led military operations, France and Germany considered that the United Kingdom had waited for its turn long enough.²⁰³

²⁰¹ James Kraska, "Coalition Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea," *Comparative Strategy* 28, no. 3 (July–Aug, 2009), 207–209; Middleton, *Pirates and how to Deal with them*, 6–7.

²⁰² "Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Government of Kenya, 25 March 2009," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1519&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010); "EU Naval Operation Against Piracy (EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta), 22 June 2009."

²⁰³ The OHQ at Potsdam was employed for Operation EUFOR RD Congo in 2006; the OHQ at Mont Valerien for Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2007–2009.

Additionally, Berlin and Paris welcomed the fact that the British leading role would represent a milestone in the development of the ESDP. The United States was not averse because the activation of Northwood would ensure close coordination and information exchange between EUNAVFOR and the US-led CTF 150 and 151 off the Horn of Africa. Against this background, the government in London decided to offer the Operation Headquarters in Northwood in October 2008.²⁰⁴

On 10 November 2008, the Council of the EU appointed Royal Navy Rear Admiral Phillip Jones as EU Operation Commander and designated the EU Operation Headquarters in Northwood. Rear Admiral Jones took over responsibility for the subsequent military strategic planning and the force generation process. The operation required at least the deployment of three warships, including helicopters and embarked security detachments, three maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA), an auxiliary vessel, and an EU Force Headquarters (FHQ). As the operation was to focus on piracy rather than the full range of threats normally associated with naval operations, it was decided that the Force Commander could assume the responsibilities of the Task Group Commander as well and conduct the operation afloat, supported by a small headquarters. After offers for the EU Force Commander post from three EU member states, the Political and Security Committee agreed to appoint first Greek Commodore Antonios Papaioannou, to be followed by Spanish and Dutch Force Commanders, each for a period of four months.²⁰⁵

Due to the small size of the required headquarters, the joint funding of the operation did not raise political controversies among the EU member states. According to the ATHENA mechanism, the common budget was to cover mainly the running costs of the EU OHQ and FHQ, while the costs for supplying the forces were shared by the troop contributing countries according to the rule “costs lie where they fall.” Because these

²⁰⁴ Bruno Waterfield, “UK to Lead EU Anti-Piracy Force Off Somalia,” *The Daily Telegraph*, sec. News, 19 November 2008; “EU schickt Kriegsschiffe gegen Piraten,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 10 November 2008; Germond and Smith, *Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU's Anti-Piracy Operation*, 585–586.

²⁰⁵ “Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, 10 November 2008;” “Political and Security Committee Decisions Atalanta/1/2008, 27 November 2008, Atalanta/1/2009, 17 March 2009, and Atalanta/6/2009, 22 July 2009,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1519&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010).

nationally borne costs represented the bulk of the operation's expenditures, the joint funding managed under the authority of the ATHENA special committee amounted to 8.3 million euros for the first year.²⁰⁶

Initial indications suggested that the EU member states were willing to provide most of the requested capabilities, including at least four warships. There was, nevertheless, a significant gap of two MPRA that could not be filled prior to the launch of the operation on 8 December 2008.²⁰⁷ Initially, EUNAVFOR was composed of a Spanish MPRA and four frigates from France, Germany, Greece, and the United Kingdom. Due to additional contributions, the force strength increased in the next months. As a result, EUNAVFOR was composed of seven frigates (two from France, two from Germany, and one each from Greece, Italy, and Spain), three MPRA (one each from France, Germany, and Spain), four corvettes (three from Sweden, and one from France), and two auxiliary vessels (one each from Germany and Spain) in July 2009.²⁰⁸

4. Conduct of Operations, Results, and Effects

The UNSCR 1846 of 2 December 2008, which extended the mandate to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa for another twelve months, set the stage for the launch of Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia on 8 December 2008.²⁰⁹ Five days later, the Operation Commander declared initial operational capability when the Greek flagship *HS Psara* entered the area of operations and took command over the assigned naval forces. Afterwards, NATO finished Operation Allied Provider and handed over WFP protection responsibilities to EUNAVFOR. Royal Navy frigate *HMS Northumberland* completed

²⁰⁶ "EU Naval Operation Against Piracy (EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta), 22 June 2009;" "CONSILIUM – Financing of ESDP Operations," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=746&lang=en> (accessed 17 October 2009).

²⁰⁷ "Jung will Fregatte an das Horn von Afrika entsenden," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 23 September 2008; Waterfield, "UK to Lead EU Anti-Piracy Force Off Somalia."

²⁰⁸ Information concerning EU Naval Force strength available at "CONSILIUM – News in Brief EUNAVFOR Somalia," http://consilium.europa.eu/App/Article/Article.aspx?article_id=26&page_id=1518&type=1&lang=en&id=1567 (accessed 12 March 2010); Germond and Smith, *Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU's Anti-Piracy Operation*, 586.

²⁰⁹ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008), 2 June 2008."

the first EU naval mission on 18 December 2008. It safely escorted the WFP ship *MV Semlow* delivering humanitarian aid from Mombassa to the Somali port of Mogadishu.²¹⁰

On 25 December 2008, EUNAVFOR engaged pirates for the first time when the German frigate *FGS Karlsruhe* assisted an Egyptian merchant ship in fighting off a pirate attack in the Gulf of Aden. The frigate's helicopter was launched after an emergency call from the Egyptian vessel and fired warning shots to deter the attack. The engagement was successfully completed when a German boarding team detained the pirates. However, the German frigate was subsequently directed to release the pirates after their weapons and equipment had been seized.²¹¹ This fact highlighted the urgent need to find a legally compliant solution for the prosecution problem. The European Union thus pressed ahead with its negotiations with Kenya and entered into an agreement on 6 March 2009.²¹²

During the first year of the operation, EUNAVFOR successfully conducted its priority mission to protect WFP shipping off the Somali coast. It provided 54 escorts to WFP ships and ensured that more than 296,000 tons of food were delivered to the port of Mogadishu.²¹³ Additionally, EUNAVFOR contributed to the protection of vulnerable shipping in the Gulf of Aden region and assisted the African Union by escorting AMISOM shipments to Somalia. Due to the linkage between operational anti-piracy efforts and the judicial follow-up, EUNAVFOR became one of the more potent and effective military forces conducting anti-piracy action off the Horn of Africa. In a number of incidents, EU naval units intercepted pirate attacks, detained individuals, and seized

²¹⁰ "British Warship Completed 1st EU Naval Mission, 18 December 2008," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1520&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010); "CONSILIUM – News in Brief EUNAVFOR Somalia;" Ploch, *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*, 19–21.

²¹¹ "Operation Atatanla's First Pirate Engagement, 25 December 2008," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1520&lang=en> (accessed 17 March 2010); "Sicherheit zur See," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 27 December 2008.

²¹² "Operation Atatanla's First Pirate Engagement Agreement Signed, 6 March 2009," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1520&lang=en> (accessed 3/17/2010); "CONSILIUM – Legal Basis EUNAVFOR Somalia," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1519&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010).

²¹³ "HR Catherine Ashton Congratulates Giovanni Gumiero on Taking Office as EU Force Commander of EUNAVFOR Somalia, 13 December 2009," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1520&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010).

armaments and equipment. In this context, the government in Nairobi accepted 52 men accused of piracy that had been detained by EU-led forces to face prosecution in Kenya.²¹⁴

Furthermore, EUNAVFOR contributed to the establishment of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden. International military assets were deployed within the area in order to improve maritime security and provide protection and support to commercial shipping. More effective communication with the commercial shipping community was achieved through the creation of a web-based interface, named Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), at the Operation Headquarters Northwood.²¹⁵ This widely recognized interface represented an important innovation in the conduct of maritime security and promoted registration, information exchange, and guidance. Finally, the Operation Headquarters established an international cooperation framework with NATO, the US-led CTF 151, other navies operating off the Somali coast, and the countries in the Horn of Africa region.²¹⁶

Nevertheless, the establishment of an international naval presence off the Horn of Africa could not prevent the explosion of pirate attacks. The number of incidents in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast increased from 111 in 2008 to 196 in 2009. Even in the IRTC, some merchant ships were attacked. Overall, 47 vessels were hijacked in 2009 (compared to 46 in 2008) and 867 crewmembers were kidnapped by pirates.

²¹⁴ Detailed information available at “European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta | A Year of Success – First Anniversary of EU NAVFOR,” <http://www.eunavfor.eu/2009/12/a-year-of-success-first-anniversary-of-eu-navfor/> (accessed 12 March 2010); “CONSILIUM – News in Brief EUNAVFOR Somalia,” Annette Weber, “Die Marineoperation der EU im Golf von Aden (EU NAVFOR Atalanta): Vorbei am Problem – Die Piraterie nimmt zu, die Ursachen bleiben,” in *Die EU als strategischer Akteur in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik?* eds. Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (Berlin: SWP-Berlin, 2009), 87.

²¹⁵ “Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa,” <http://www.mschoa.eu/About.aspx> (accessed 12 March 2010).

²¹⁶ Germond and Smith, *Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU's Anti-Piracy Operation*, 586–587. Detailed information available at “CONSILIUM – News in Brief EUNAVFOR Somalia,” “CONSILIUM – Press Releases EUNAVFOR Somalia,” <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1520&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010); “European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta | A Year of Success – First Anniversary of EU NAVFOR.”

Moreover, ten merchant seamen were injured and five were killed.²¹⁷ Additionally, the prosecution agreement with Kenya raised difficulties. Despite financial and logistical support from the European Union, the country's legal framework remained inefficient. By the end of 2009, only a small number of those detained and charged with piracy had been fully processed through the Kenyan judicial system. It is important to note that the Kenyan government withdrew from the agreements with the European Union and the United States in April 2010.²¹⁸

However, the European Union, other international actors, and the TGS began to address the root causes of piracy in Somalia. Coastal communities received access to socioeconomic support in order to protect local fishing areas, cooperative businesses, and small-scale industries. Somalia's transitional state authorities, the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, and the new administration of Puntland initiated new efforts in capacity building to address lawlessness. International actors supported the capacity building, for example, by funding the establishment of a Somali Coast Guard.²¹⁹ As a result, a comprehensive approach to maritime security began to work in the Horn of Africa region. Whether these efforts will succeed remains to be seen.

D. COMPARISON: EU-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE EU'S APPROACH TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

The case studies have provided evidence that the planning and decision-making process of the operations examined reflect not only the need for appropriate consultations with the twenty-six EU member states participating in the ESDP, but also the EU's understanding in policy, strategy, and operations of comprehensive security. Most EU

²¹⁷ "Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – IMB Piracy Annual Report 2009," http://www.icc-cs.org/index.php?option=com_fabrik&view=form&fabrik=18&random=0&Itemid=92&phpMyAdmin=F5XY3CeBeymbElbQ8jr4qlxK1J3 (accessed 12 March 2010).

²¹⁸ "Kenia: Keine Piratenprozesse mehr," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, sec. Politik, 3 April 2010; "No Solutions in Sight to Somalia's Insecurity: Troubled Period of Lawlessness is Hard to End," *Strategic Comments* 15, no. 9 (2009), 1–5; "Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Republic of Seychelles, Dated 2 December 2009," <http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1519&lang=en> (accessed 12 March 2010). The European Union had entered into another pirate engagement agreement with the Republic of Seychelles on 2 December 2009.

²¹⁹ "INTERNATIONAL/SOMALIA: Anti-Piracy Results are Mixed," *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service* (20 January 2010), 1.

member states do not have ambitions for the European Union to evolve into a “hard power” actor comparable to the United States of America. The EU’s aim is to become a security actor able to contribute to international crisis management efforts by exercising a wide range of civil and military instruments.

In Operation EUFOR RD Congo (July–December 2006), the short-term military engagement supplemented a number of long-term civil efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at a sensitive point in the country’s political transition process. Additionally, the mission was planned and executed in support of a clear political objective. By supporting MONUC in the summer of 2006, EUFOR facilitated the conduct of the first free and relatively fair elections in that country in over forty years. Because its limited mandate was accomplished, the operation can be regarded as a political success. Nevertheless, the planning and decision making, as well as the force-generation process, disclosed serious weaknesses, flaws, and obstacles.

First, the discord among the EU member states regarding the question of burden sharing led to a number of difficulties. Although member states and the European Commission quickly reached a general consensus that a military operation was appropriate, some major countries concurrently remained reluctant to provide the necessary military contributions. The European Union therefore needed nearly three months in order to identify headquarters and major troop contributors for the operation. As a result, Operation EUFOR RD Congo was certainly not an example of rapid reaction.

Second, the deliberations in Brussels did not focus on the question of how the operation could be incorporated into the EU’s comprehensive approach to the DRC. Due to the protracted political decision making, the real time for strategic planning, force generation, and deployment was exceptionally compressed. However, the Council General Secretariat and the European Commission did not use the opportunity to prepare a grand strategic plan ensuring full coherence between the short-term military operation and the long-term civil activities in the country. Because the European Union did not produce a separate crisis management concept, the military strategic planning for the operation had to proceed on the basis of a simple option paper. This lack of effective coordination hampered the development of a truly integrated approach.

Although the Operation Headquarters quickly completed the subsequent military strategic planning, the operational documents were unable to substitute for the missing strategic plan. Without clear political guidance, the Operation Commander was unable to develop sustainable modalities of cooperation between EUFOR and other EU actors and missions in the country. Such cooperation, therefore, had to be established in country on an ad hoc and personal basis. Against this background, Operation EUFOR RD Congo may be assessed as a limited political success, but not as a role model for the EU's comprehensive approach to security in future military operations.

In contrast, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA (March 2008 – March 2009) was incorporated into an overall concept of EU crisis management that considered short-term military engagement along with long-term civil efforts. The success of this comprehensive approach to crisis management depended basically on two essential elements: effective coordination of all relevant EU actors and the willingness of the member states to participate in a joint action as required. The comprehensive planning of ESDP-relevant EU bodies worked comparatively well at all stages of the political and strategic decision-making process. The European Union was actually able to incorporate civil and military contributions into its crisis management planning. The European Commission, for example, was willing to bring in its already existing medium and long-term programs. However, the planning suffered a priori from a fundamental problem. While some member states, in particular France, advocated a military operation in central Africa, there was an ongoing discussion about the grand strategy and the question of how the EU might address, if at all, the deteriorating situation in the crisis triangle of Darfur, Chad, and the CAR.

Despite this fact, the European Union concluded that military action in Chad and the CAR was appropriate. Accordingly, the subsequent planning for Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA was accomplished without a grand strategic design for the triangle of crises. Although the military operation was expected to contribute to the EU's engagement in tackling the crisis in Darfur, the main aim was actually limited to preventing the spread of the Darfur crisis into the western border regions. Consequently, the crisis management concept was suitable for addressing some of the effects rather than the causes of the

overall crisis. Against this background, it was not surprising that several EU member states, including Germany and the United Kingdom, remained reluctant to contribute significant forces to this operation. The required capabilities were probably available in some member states, but the political will to employ them in this case plainly was not. As a result, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA suffered more from the lack of common understanding of means and ends among the EU member states than from a lack of comprehensive planning within the European Union.

Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia (launched in December 2008) represents an important step forward in comparison with the operations noted above. First, the British move towards EU-led anti-piracy action was essential for an efficient agreement among the EU member states. It paved the way for the first maritime operation under the aegis of the European Union. The operation was then planned and conducted as a part of the EU's comprehensive approach to the ongoing Somali crisis. The short-term naval deployment was designed to supplement a number of long-term civil efforts intended to address piracy and lawlessness. The operation was successfully embedded into the EU's joint strategy for Somalia. This commitment could only aspire to helping solve the underlying problems of Somalia's instability in the long run. In the absence of a short-term (and enduring) regional solution ashore, the deployment of naval assets was necessary to tackle the consequences, but not the roots of the piracy problem. The political-military objective of the operation was therefore clearly limited to helping suppress piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast for an initial period of one year.

In order to accomplish its mission, EUNAVFOR Somalia demanded a credible deterrence capacity relying on effective law enforcement to ensure the prosecution of those accused of piracy and armed robbery. Despite a broad range of legal and civil-military uncertainties, the European Union implemented a new approach to combat piracy involving EU member states and third states in the Horn of Africa region. It succeeded in overcoming most of the legal difficulties through the combined efforts of EU member states, the Council General Secretariat, and the European Commission. The European Commission, for example, contributed decisively to the conclusion of the prosecution agreement with Kenya that helped to ensure a close linkage between

operational anti-piracy efforts at sea and the judicial follow-up ashore. The EUNAVFOR therefore became one of the more potent and effective military forces off the Horn of Africa. It successfully protected the World Food Program and AMISOM²²⁰ shipments to Somalia, deterred pirate attacks, detained a number of suspects and brought them to court.

With Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia, the European Union developed and implemented a more integrated approach to comprehensive security in the face of a threat to EU and worldwide interests. The operation demonstrated that the CSDP can become an instrument that serves the interests of the European Union and its member states both directly by protecting their maritime trade and indirectly by stabilizing crisis regions in the wider European neighborhood. One can therefore argue that a “culture of coordination” as envisaged in the EU crisis management procedures and subsequent planning concepts is developing.²²¹ However, the greatest internal challenge ahead remains the effective coordination of all the civil and military instruments at hand, enabling crisis management to be planned and conducted in an integrated fashion from beginning to end. Chapter IV provides an analysis of decisive factors for the improvement of a comprehensive approach to security in future EU-led military operations.

²²⁰ The acronym AMISOM stands for African Union Mission in Somalia.

²²¹ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “The EU as a Civil–Military Crisis Manager,” *International Journal*, no. Spring (2006), 438; Knutsen, *The EU and the Challenges of Civil–Military Coordination at the Strategic Level*, 49.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The quest for comprehensive security has characterized the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) since its launch in 1999. The concept of comprehensive security relies on a broader definition of security, one that is far more extensive than traditional, state-centric and defense-oriented political-military approaches. It calls for a holistic and normative approach to crisis management, and it attempts to operationalize multiple dimensions of security. The main idea is the activation and integration of all instruments at hand—diplomatic, military, financial, judicial, police, customs, reconstruction and development—in order to address the root causes of conflicts. In this context, military forces are to establish and ensure a safe and secure environment in which civil instruments can unfold their full potential to solve the underlying problems of international crises or internal instability. The sustainable improvement of stability and security in crisis regions depends, in turn, on cross-departmental and interagency cooperation at the member state level and on close collaboration among all relevant actors at the EU level.

Although the European Security Strategy (ESS) offers a rationale to address multiple security threats in a complex environment, the variety of security objectives presents crucial analytical and practical difficulties. For example, the many “kinds of security” hamper a clear understanding of what is really meant by “security” and what the requirements are for action. The ESS offers little in terms of concrete recommendations with regard to the course and direction of the EU’s security and defense policy. Furthermore, the ESS and subsequent documents do not provide a sound mechanism that merges the full spectrum of policy instruments into the single methodological framework that comprehensive security demands. At first glance, this fact appears surprising because the mix of civil and military instruments is at the heart of the EU’s security and defense policy. The vague nature of the ESS derives, though, from the divergent national security cultures of the EU member states. Moreover, the absence of clearly defined criteria leaves the member states and EU bodies room for flexible maneuvers in order to pursue national or group interests at the EU level.

Nevertheless, the European Union has made significant progress with regard to the implementation of the comprehensive approach to security in comparison with the uncoordinated state of affairs in the 1990s. In 2006, Operation EUFOR RD Congo and the multiple civil EU activities in that country were coordinated on an ad hoc and personal day-to-day basis between the relevant EU actors on the ground (e.g., the EU Special Representative, the EU Force Commander, the Heads of Mission of EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo, and the Head of the Commission's Delegation in Kinshasa). For Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the European Commission was involved in the planning process from the beginning in July 2007. The Commission was willing to bring in its already existing programs for Chad and the CAR and supported the funding of the UN police training program in Chad and the construction of return zones for displaced persons. Despite that, both the Council of the EU and the European Commission did not implement a truly integrated approach in order to address the underlying causes of the crises in Darfur, Chad and the CAR. Finally, Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia was framed as a part of the EU's comprehensive approach to the Somali crisis in 2008. The naval anti-piracy action was planned along with long-term civil efforts to address lawlessness in the Horn of Africa region. More effective coordination between EU member states, the Council General Secretariat, and the European Commission made it possible, for example, to deal with the problem of bringing piracy suspects to justice. With Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia, the European Union developed and implemented a more integrated approach to crisis management. However, the gradual development towards a more integrated approach cannot hide the fact that significant flaws and weaknesses hampered the implementation of the EU's comprehensive security strategy in the three military operations examined. Three distinct aspects are relevant.

First, the implementation of a truly integrated approach demanded cross-departmental and interagency cooperation at the national level as well as close collaboration among the relevant bodies at the EU level. In this regard, the Council General Secretariat, the European Commission, EU member states, and the Operation Headquarters needed too much time for solving operational problems at the strategic

level—for example, the legal uncertainties related to the judicial follow-up of the EU's anti-piracy efforts. Even though the European Union has become more efficient in bringing together the different instruments it has at its disposal, the civil-military interface remains an important problem. EUNAVFOR Somalia, like the other two operations examined, suffered from the absence of a sound coordination mechanism. Therefore, the European Union needs to develop a comprehensive security concept through which the plethora of civil and military tools could be seamlessly synchronized into a truly integrated and coherent approach to crisis management. This concept has to define clear terms, mechanisms, procedures, and responsibilities for the coordination of actors and instruments at different levels of action (political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, and tactical).

Second, the institutional architecture of the EU's security and defense policy and the competitive roles of the relevant EU bodies complicated the planning and decision making of the three operations examined. While the military crisis management was strictly conducted according to intergovernmental procedures, the civilian development and peace-building efforts for the long run were embedded in the supranational community. Even though EU member states, the Council General Secretariat, and the European Commission sought close coordination, the planning and decision making continued to be cumbersome and time-consuming. Moreover, even if the European Commission was willing to bring in its already existing programs, it remained reluctant concerning significant readjustments of its policies. Consequently, the institutional architecture and the coordination framework of the ESDP were not able to bridge the gap between the external activities of the Council of the EU, the European Commission, and EU member states. The new institutional arrangements under the Lisbon Treaty, including the creation of the new combined High Representative post and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), could be an important step on the way to overcome these difficulties. Whether these changes will succeed in this regard remains to be seen.

However, a further problem arises from the enduring absence of a permanent Operation Headquarters. The case studies have confirmed prevalent observations that the

comprehensive planning did not always adequately address the most important elements of a possible military operation (e.g., the number of requested troops, the necessary means and capabilities, the operation's expense and its duration).²²² In the words of a CGS official: "When you plan something from Brussels at the strategic level, fundamentally there are three different things that member states would really like to know: how many troops, how much money, and how long?"²²³ In this regard, the early planning at the political and strategic level suffered from a lack of military-strategic and operational-level expertise. A permanent Operation Headquarters could provide the required input from the very beginning of the planning process and enhance the quality of the comprehensive planning documents.

Third, the individual views and diverging interests of the EU member states posed a number of practical problems. Significant discord among the national governments concerned, for example, the question of burden sharing—an unending story. The planning and decision making of the three operations examined was significantly affected by the ways that the member states bargained with each other over the issues of who would do what for the joint action that all agreed was appropriate. While the member states quickly reached common ground concerning the need for comprehensiveness in these operations, they very hesitantly offered the requested forces and capabilities. Although the EU crisis management procedures set the stage for comprehensive planning and close coordination between member states and EU bodies, they could not substitute for a common understanding within the European Union.²²⁴

A single EU member state may, in fact, be able to pave the way for the launch of a certain EU-led military operation. If the political influence is strong enough, the

²²² Among other sources, see Stuart Gordon, "Exploring the Civil–Military Interface and its Impact on European Strategic and Operational Personalities: 'Civilianisation' and Limiting Military Roles in Stabilisation Operations?" *European Security* 15, no. 3 (2006), 350–357; Knutsen, *The EU and the Challenges of Civil–Military Coordination at the Strategic Level*, 44–50; Simon, *Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations*, 39–45; Agnieszka Nowak, *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 123–138.

²²³ Quoted in Simon, *Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations*, 40.

²²⁴ This problem concerns not only the EU's security and defense policy. As this thesis is being concluded, contemporary events connected with the common currency and domestic politics make the issue examined in this study as urgent as ever, especially in a world that cannot secure lasting peace and for whom the burdens of security seem to increase steadily in the new century.

country may be able to get the operation accepted despite extensive reluctance among other EU member states. Yet, this national ability to sway EU decision making clearly ends when the force generation process begins. Notwithstanding solemn assurances about the merits of joint action, most EU member states remain unwilling to provide forces when common EU interests are not greatly at risk. From a realist point of view, the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA can be seen as a French attempt to pursue distinct national interests in Africa through the EU's security and defense policy. However, if the government in Paris had the aim of multiplying its power by EU means and shifting national burdens to other EU member states, the French policy failed. In the end, France was compelled to contribute most of the requested EU forces and capabilities and had to pay the lion's share of the operation's expense.

On the other hand, despite the existing distinctions in national security cultures, public opinion in every EU member state shares a set of common interests and values. Even in skeptical countries, the EU's security and defense policy and its comprehensive approach have become widely accepted by now.²²⁵ The European Security Strategy (ESS) actually constitutes a sustainable compromise between the EU member states. Although it does not provide a sound comprehensive security concept for crisis management, the main features of the ESS represent the nucleus of a common EU security culture. Accordingly, if a critical mass of member states comes to the conclusion that common EU interests are involved and that joint action is appropriate, reluctant governments have huge difficulties to avoid following the spearheading nations. The operations EUFOR RD Congo and EUNAVFOR Somalia have provided evidence in this regard.

During the planning of EUFOR RD Congo, the EU member states unanimously agreed that joint action was appropriate. Germany was willing to support the peace process and the reconstruction efforts in the DRC, but it did not want to provide military forces and capabilities. Moreover, the government in Berlin did not aim to take a leading role in the operation. From a constructivist point of view, this attitude was, *inter alia*, caused by the German "culture of restraint," which relied in particular on the rejection of

²²⁵ Denmark, which does not participate in the EU's security and defense policy, is the sole exception.

national military power projection and on civilian—virtually pacifist—sentiments within the public. However, Germany appeared to be the EU member state militarily most able to provide the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) and some of the needed forces. The government in Berlin therefore came under increasing pressure to adjust its power projection policy according to emerging EU norms and contribute with military capabilities to EUFOR RD Congo. Eventually, the German government hesitantly accepted a part of the leadership responsibility and offered a large portion of the requested forces, even though the public's acceptance of national military power projection was slow.

The planning and decision making of EUNAVFOR Somalia surprisingly led a “reluctant follower” of European integration—the United Kingdom—to accept a military leading role on the EU stage. The deliberations among the EU member states made it clear that the majority was willing to launch a common anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden. The United Kingdom, however, would have preferred a NATO-led operation because both domestic policy-makers and the public remained hesitant regarding the EU's military aspirations. In the face of increasing pressure from its EU partners, the government in London finally adjusted its position and thus paved the way for a general agreement among the EU member states. Subsequently, this change in policy made it possible for the United Kingdom to take a leading role in the first maritime operation under the aegis of the European Union. The fact that naval operations were a longstanding area of British competence and tradition might have facilitated London's decision, a choice that represented a milestone in the development of the ESDP.

Furthermore, the case studies have also shown that the ESDP was not designed to replace NATO or to balance US power. While NATO remained responsible for the territorial defense of its member nations, the United States of America persisted as the most important ally for the EU's “big three,” France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In this context, the case studies confirmed Jolyon Howorth's observation that “whatever the EU eventually does autonomously will be broadly consistent with a harmonious

transatlantic relationship.”²²⁶ The ESDP actually served as an instrument to establish the European Union as an international security actor, but definitely not to challenge the United States. However, the inception of the CSDP and its new institutional arrangements could lead to stronger competition between the European Union and NATO in the field of security and defense. It is nevertheless probable that the CSDP will not eliminate the lack of political cohesiveness that characterized the ESDP. The US leadership, which facilitates consensus building in NATO, has no single-state equivalent in the European Union. Hence, the further development of the CSDP will depend on credible leadership through, for example, informal directorates or small-group collaboration among EU member states.

Surprisingly enough, despite the fact that the EU member states pursued competing agendas, their national policies, taken together, advanced the EU’s security and defense policy for different reasons. While the ESDP offered Germany the opportunity to balance the tensions between its preferences for civil crisis management instruments on the one hand and for collective security on the other, for France it represented the fulfillment of a longstanding dream of national leaders. Simultaneously, France’s quest to promote and dominate this new field of EU policy encountered the United Kingdom’s reluctance to let Paris claim the sole leading role. As a result, even skeptical member states, which are well characterized as reluctant participants in the European integration process, played a significant role in the development and advancement of the EU’s security and defense policy.

In sum, the European Union has reached a common understanding of comprehensive security based on an admittedly limited set of shared values and interests. There is broad support among the EU member states for the integration of civil and military instruments, the active prevention of conflict and instability, the pursuit of multilateral and rule-based cooperation, and the definition of a global scope of action. There is evidence that military operations have the potential to add value to the EU’s

²²⁶ Jolyon Howorth, “A Work in Progress,” *Harvard International Review* 27, no. 4 (2006), 83.

comprehensive approach to security. Nevertheless, the implementation of this holistic and normative approach is still hampered for the different reasons analyzed in this thesis.

The thesis has identified three decisive factors for the improvement of the EU's comprehensive approach to security. First, the European Union needs a sound concept through which its plethora of civil and military tools could be seamlessly integrated and synchronized into a truly coherent and comprehensive approach to crisis management. Second, the European Union could benefit from the establishment of a permanent Operation Headquarters (whether a genuine military or a civil-military OHQ) providing the required input from the very beginning of the comprehensive planning process for crisis management. Third, the EU's security and defense policy could become more coherent and capable if small groups of credible nations cooperated to offer leadership, perhaps in informal directorates. The key question in this respect remains whether and how the European Union can address the friction between the need for effective leadership on the one hand and the imperative of political legitimacy on the other.

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